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Can this cockpit hold The vasty fields of France? Or may we cram Within
this Wooden 0 the very casques That did affright the air at Agincourt?
-Henry V, Prologue
Imagine a world where every online store sells DRM-free music encoded in
open licensable formats. In such a world, any player can play music pur-
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chased from any store, and any store can sell music which is playable on all
players. This is clearly the best alternative for consumers, and Apple would
embrace it in a heartbeat.
-Steve Jobs1
INTRODUCTION
Section 1201 of the landmark 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act
2
(DMCA) provided sweeping protection for technological measures or "vir-
tual locks" on digital content to protect the entertainment industries-
including music, films, games, and consumer electronics. Manufacturers
use digital rights management (DRM) authorized under the law to lock
down all software embedded in products, movies on DVDs, and audio files
sold on iTunes and other Internet sites. Critics of the DMCA have charged
that the law has extended well past its anti-piracy role to undermine fair use,
threaten free speech, and thwart product interoperability. Critics of DRM
complain that DRM unfairly extends copyright and that legal protection is
unnecessary to the robust development of new creative works.
This Article reviews the difficulties of the DMCA implementation, fo-
cusing on the implications of a marketplace in which DRM fails either as a
result of technological countermeasures or statutory change. After review-
ing the legal history of the DMCA, however, I hope to bring the potential
implications of the DMCA backlash into focus by emphasizing the need to
protect the author working in the modem digital medium.
The DMCA is a relatively short but highly significant group of statu-
tory amendments to the Copyright Act, which included the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and Performances and
Phonograms Treaty implementation, copyright safe harbor provisions in-
volving computer maintenance and transitory server copies of music, and
the Copyright Protection and Management Systems.' Section 1201, the
copyright protection portion of the Act, is generally referred to as "the
DMCA." Section 1201 is the provision that focuses most heavily on the
technological and legal "code" battle over the digitization of entertainment
and media content.4
The code battle highlights the tension over the locus of regulatory con-
trol. Does statutory code control the behavior of the public, or does the
1. Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.apple.com-
/hotnews/thoughtsonnusic/.
2. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
3. Id.
4. See Dan L. Burk, Panel IV: Market Regulation and Innovation: Legal and Tech-
nical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 537, 546
(2005). See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
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computer code serve as the primary source of consumer behavior control?5
Underlying this dichotomy is the need to reduce piracy and intellectual
property theft, as well as the need to positively respond to the increasingly
interactive nature of the consumer. Authors and distributors should have
the right to control the distribution of their products.' The public has an
expectation that ownership of copies of a work carries with it the right to
use or abuse the particular copy of the work owned.7 Moreover, websites
such as Myspace.com and YouTube.com demonstrate that the availability of
interactive technology has changed the relationship between author and
audience, perhaps radically transforming the expectations of what is "fair"
under the classical notions of fair use.
Professor Peter Yu identifies the analysis of DRM as a debate with
two polar positions. "In today's DRM debate, there are generally two dif-
ferent camps. While rights holders, their investors and representatives are
on one side, academics (usually liberal academics), consumer advocates,
and civil libertarians are on the other."8 Although an academic, I side with
the artists and their corporate enablers because I would prefer the policy
balance to foster creativity instead of access. Nonetheless, in fairness, I
should also recognize my own consumer habits. I love my digital video
recorder (DVR) and fast-forward through most over-the-air commercials; I
detest DVDs that do not allow the viewer to skip previews; and the audio
books I keep on hand both in my car and on my phone come from the public
library rather than a for-profit vendor. My consumer behaviors seem typical
of a public that finds DRM an annoyance and distrusts media corporations
that seek to impose advertising or usage patterns as a condition of its media
consumption.
Embedded in the debate are philosophical assumptions about the role
of copyright to incentivize authors, musicians, artists, and other creators,9 as
5. I have written elsewhere that this dichotomy ignores the more important norma-
tive or social code inherent in copyright policy. See Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A
Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1278,
1339 (2003).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
7. Id. § 109.
8. Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L.
REv. 13, 16 (2006).
9. The Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), amply illustrated
the debate. Compare the majority opinion:
As we have explained, "[tihe economic philosophy behind the [Copyright]
[C]lause... is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors." Accordingly, "copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing
that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the
public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge .... The profit motive
is the engine that ensures the progress of science."
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well as the role of law, technology, and social norms to enforce the customs
of copyright protection. ° Increasingly, the debate has moved from the role
of copyright itself to the technological implications of the policy and the
strategies for enforcing the policy." To the extent this Article conflates the
health of copyright with the ability to enforce authors' rights12 using DRM,
this Article suffers from some of those same limitations. I try, therefore,
first to explain the arenas where the DMCA has benefited and hindered the
broader cause of copyright. Nonetheless, I also look at the implications of
copyright in the absence of technological measures for enforcement to see if
there is any incentive left in the copyright regime.
I. THE CODIFICATION OF ANTICIRCUMVISION
Professor Yu readily points out that the two sides "agree on many is-
sues, and their positions are not irreconcilable."' 3 Instead of an absolutist
battle, the debate should more properly focus on the developing balance
between the positions. Given my personal dislike of limitations imposed on
copyrighted works by the distributors for embedded commercials or dis-
Id. at 212 n.18 (citations omitted) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affid, 60 F.3d 913
(2d Cir. 1994)), with the dissent of Justice Breyer:
"Under the U.S. Constitution, the primary objective of copyright law is not to re-
ward the author, but rather to secure for the public the benefits derived from the au-
thors' labors. By giving authors an incentive to create, the public benefits in two
ways: when the original expression is created and. . . when the limited term...
expires and the creation is added to the public domain."
For present purposes, then, we should take the following as well established: that
copyright statutes must serve public, not private, ends; that they must seek "to
promote the Progress" of knowledge and learning; and that they must do so both by
creating incentives for authors to produce and by removing the related restrictions
on dissemination after expiration of a copyright's "limited Tim[e]"--a time that
(like "a limited monarch") is "restrain[ed]" and "circumscribe[d]," "not [left] at
large[.]"
Id. at 247-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, at
17 (1988); 2 S. JOHNSON, A DIcTIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1151 (4th rev. ed.
1773)).
10. See Garon, supra note 5, at 1360 ("The central task, then, is to reverse Internet
anarchy through a combination of education, technology and law, shaping each in concert
with the others so that the copyright balance can be restored and ownership respected, while
maintaining the important role of the public domain, fair use, and reverse engineering.").
11. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95
GEO. L.J. 1 (2006).
12. As used herein, author rights include the rights of all authors, writers, artists, and
others whose work is protected by copyright. The term should not connote a preference for
one artistic form over another.
13. Yu, supra note 8, at 16.
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abled fast-forward buttons, I am quick to sympathize with the pro-consumer
civil libertarians (or more properly, conscientious objectors).
Caught up in the tension between the content distributors and chang-
ing public expectations, the anticircumvention provisions became a social
lightning rod in the clash of ideologies and expectations. As in any ideo-
logical debate, there may never be an objectively accurate synthesis, so this
Article will instead modestly attempt to provide a centrist history of Section
1201 and outline its continuing impact on the reshaping of technology, en-
tertainment, and media content.
A. Changing International Law to Revise Domestic Law
Section 1201 is a codification of treaty obligations enacted in the
WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.
Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty provides that
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are
used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or
the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not
authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.14
Nonetheless, candor requires us to acknowledge that the international obli-
gations are a somewhat spurious rationale because the U.S. intellectual
property industry set the international agenda. As copyright expert David
Nimmer explained, "[d]espite the formal rule of 'one nation, one vote,' U.S.
participation in Geneva was actually massive .... Los Angeles represents
the quintessence of the United States. California's status as the seat of the
Hollywood studios, the record industry and Silicon Valley all cement its
status at the cynosure."'' 5
As a result, the U.S. content industries created an international need
for adequate legal protection against the circumvention of effective techno-
logical measures for online content or content digitally encrypted. The need
for such international protection was legitimate. Digital protection of con-
tent was seen as a powerful tool to help open markets in which copyright
piracy is otherwise rampant and where court systems are inadequate to ad-
dress even rudimentary legal protection. The "effective legal remedies"
14. World Intellectual Property Organization: Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20,
1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 76, available at http://www.wipo.int-
/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocswo033.html#P- 87_12240.
15. David Nimmer, Time and Space, 38 IDEA 501, 508-09 (1998). See also David
Nimmer, A Tale of Two Treaties, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 1 (1997); David Nimmer,
Aus der Neuen Welt, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 195, 196-97 (1998). These three articles reflect on
the adoption of the WIPO treaties.
Spring]
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provision was designed to encourage signatories to take their copyright en-
forcement obligations seriously.
Of course, the 1996 view of the world could not fully fathom the sys-
tematic change wrought by the Internet. 6 In explaining the history of the
legislation, the Second Circuit explained: "Fearful that the ease with which
pirates could copy and distribute a copyrightable work in digital form was
overwhelming the capacity of conventional copyright enforcement to find
and enjoin unlawfully copied material, Congress sought to combat copy-
right piracy in its earlier stages, before the work was even copied."' 7 The
assumption in 1996 was that strong encryption would greatly limit who had
access to piracy tools so that the small number of sophisticated pirates could
be effectively identified and arrested. 8
Section 1201 was enacted to comply with the obligations of the WIPO
Copyright Treaty by addressing three distinct types of anticircumvention
infringement. The first provision, Section 1201(a)(1)(A), protects a work's
security from unauthorized decryption or, in other words, bans picking any
virtual lock. "No person shall circumvent a technological measure that ef-
fectively controls access to a [copyrighted] work. .... ""
The second provision, Section 1201(a)(2), prohibits trafficking in
black box technology or more formally, technology "produced for the pur-
pose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a [copyrighted] work ....
The third provision, Section 1201(b)(1), prohibits trafficking in anti-
circumvention technologies "that allow some forms of 'access' but restrict
other uses of the copyrighted work .... Section 1201 (b)(1) would there-
fore apply to the situation in which an Internet streaming audio player was
tweaked or circumvented to permit the downloading of that content.
B. No Admittance-The DMCA's Role as Back Stage Bouncer
The anticircumvention provision and the two anti-trafficking provi-
sions are explicitly designed to protect digital movies, music, software, and
games protected by encryption. "Prior to the DMCA, a copyright owner
16. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
17. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2001), aff'g
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346.
18. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 522-23
(1999).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
20. Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A).
21. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 545 (6th
Cir. 2004).
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would have had no cause of action against anyone who circumvented any
sort of technological control, but did not infringe. The DMCA rebalanced
these interests to favor the copyright owner; the DMCA created circumven-
tion liability for 'digital trespass' under § 1201(a)(1). '2 2 While circumvent-
ing a technology without some unauthorized copying of the encryption or
intermediary copying may be difficult, the evidence of such infringement
would be problematic and costly to produce. The evidence that a program
or device circumvents a technological measure is self-evident by its opera-
tions.
The legal fight that framed the debate over the DMCA's scope began
with Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,23 involving the Content
Scramble System (CSS) adopted by the motion picture studios to standard-
ize and enhance the encryption for DVDs.24 Reimerdes and a second defen-
dant subsequently were settled out of the lawsuit, while Eric Corley and his
hacker magazine and website continued the litigation through appeal.25
The computer program in question in Reimerdes was precisely the
type of software for which the statute was enacted. DeCSS, the name of the
program, allowed for the decryption of the CSS encryption used to protect
DVDs so they could be copied onto computer hard drives and, through use
of compression software, traded on the Internet.26 The motion picture stu-
dios coordinated their response through the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) to stop the posting of the software.
Legally, the MPAA was successful. The Second Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of the law, including the ability to compel a takedown of
both the DeCSS and links to other sites where the software was available.27
The Court identified the decryption software as a violation of both the anti-
circumvention provision of Section 1201 (a)(1) and the anti-trafficking pro-
vision of Section 1201(a)(2). The case was a very important win for the
MPAA because without court legitimacy, its efforts at thwarting piracy
would be much more difficult. With a victory in hand, the organization was
able to demand that websites and web hosts remove the decryption soft-
ware.
Although the outcome of the case was precisely what Congress had in-
tended, a great deal of consternation and debate regarding the litigation
arose. The defendants had argued that there was a need for DeCSS because
22. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1195-96 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
23. 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
24. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436-37 (2d Cir. 2001).
25. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 346.
26. Corley, 273 F.3d at 438. See Xiaomin Huang, Peter Radkowski III & Peter
Roman, Computer Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 285 (2007).
27. Corley, 273 F.3d at 455-56.
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no DVD viewing software had been licensed for Linux, the open source
computer operating system. Given that the nature of open source software
would have had the effect of publishing the encryption key for CSS, the
complaint was accurate. The political effect was to rally the open source
community around the plaintiffs and paint the MPAA as a litigious bully no
different than the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA). The
legitimacy of the complaint, however, was irrelevant, since it would never
have been a reasonable fair use claim to give away the encryption code in
an effort to service a market intentionally avoided by the copyright holder.
Added to the polemic nature of online debate was the nature of the in-
junctive relief. Both the software program and the code for DeCSS had
been posted on the Internet so that they were freely available. The more
attention provided to the litigation, the more mirror sites added links to the
software. The Reimerdes Court enjoined more than the posting of and traf-
ficking in DeCSS.28 The district court focused heavily on the extent to
which a ban on the encryption software itself limited the free expression of
the defendants. The district court treated the statute as content-neutral, fo-
cusing on the effects of the circumvention software rather than its commu-
nicative nature, and relied on the same types of constitutional ordinances
that restrict adult theatres.29
Acknowledging that the defendants were linking to third-party sites in
order to continue encouraging the distribution of DeCSS, the district court
attempted to create a substantially higher standard for enjoining linking.3° It
likened the heightened standard to that of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,31
creating a standard that would exclude all uses but those intentionally abet-
ting circumvention. Of course, the defendants had exceeded this standard:
[P]laintiffs have established by clear and convincing evidence that these defendants
linked to sites posting DeCSS, knowing that it was a circumvention device. In-
deed, they initially touted it as a way to get free movies, and they later maintained
28. Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 294.
29. Id. at 329 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986))
("As Congress' concerns in enacting the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA were to
suppress copyright piracy and infringement and to promote the availability of copyrighted
works in digital form, and not to regulate the expression of ideas that might be inherent in
particular anti-circumvention devices or technology, this provision of the statute properly is
viewed as content neutral.").
30. Id. at 341 ("[T]here may be no injunction against, nor liability for, linking to a
site containing circumvention technology, the offering of which is unlawful under the
DMCA, absent clear and convincing evidence that those responsible for the link (a) know at
the relevant time that the offending material is on the linked-to site, (b) know that it is cir-
cumvention technology that may not lawfully be offered, and (c) create or maintain the link
for the purpose of disseminating that technology.").
31. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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the links to promote the dissemination of the program in an effort to defeat effec-
tive judicial relief.32
Nonetheless, the links to DeCSS remained easy to find through search
engines. The attempt to thwart access to DeCSS by enjoining only the
named plaintiffs had no effect, other than to encourage more postings and
links to the software. The court's barring of the plaintiffs right to publish
an Internet address also seemed heavy-handed, notwithstanding the thought-
ful analysis that went into the opinion. Outside of the media industries, my
admittedly unscientific review of computer magazines and intellectual
property literature suggested that the opinion was not well understood and
was largely disliked.
Despite the lack of popularity, the decision has helped the MPAA and
the efforts to reduce piracy. Since the Reimerdes/Corley decision, all sub-
sequent courts have reinforced the basic presumptions that the use or sale of
black boxes and software programs to circumvent encryption are unlawful.33
Although the courts are showing some appropriate restraint in the use of
Section 1201 by tying it directly to the protection of copyrighted works,34
they have not weakened the shield provided to content distributors.
The DeCSS litigation has forged a legal shield for the distributors of
software and entertainment content. With robust decisions outlawing soft-
ware black boxes, the jurisprudence removes the political and social debate
regarding the "rights" of consumers to back up their DVDs. Academic and
journalistic claims that Congress could not legally limit the ways in which a
consumer uses a copy of a DVD seem to have diminished in the wake of the
decision.
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,3" further reinforced this trend by finding third-party
copyright liability for the inducement of copyright infringement.3 6 Many of
the academic and industry leaders awaited the Grokster decision to clarify
the debate regarding the scope of the safe harbor first articulated in Sony
32. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (footnote omitted).
33. E.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2006); 321 Studios v.
Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (CSS);
Pearl Invs., LLC v. Standard 1/0, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326, 349-50 (D. Me. 2003) (virtual
private network); RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1889 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000); Sony Computer Entm't Am. Inc. v. Gamemasters,
87 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (PlayStation game console CD-ROM).
34. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d
1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, 431 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Chamberlain
Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (restricting appli-
cation of § 1201 where there was no underlying copyright claim).
35. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
36. Id. at 934.
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Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.37 The Sony Court had pro-
tected a product manufacturer from secondary liability when the manufac-
turer had introduced a product "capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
Some analysts hoped that the Supreme Court would extend or narrow Sony
to the question in Grokster, but even in Napster, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit had recognized that a peer-to-peer network was capa-
ble of both infringing and noninfringing uses.39
As the Court in Grokster explained, "[O]ne who distributes a device
with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable
for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties."4
Critics of DRM have been frustrated by the Grokster approach.
"When the Supreme Court granted review ... technology developers hoped
at minimum for a clearer statement of the applicable rule. Instead, the Court
declined to resolve the disagreement, and compounded the uncertainty by
articulating an alternative basis for contributory infringement liability based
on intent to induce infringement."'" But this frustration assumes too much.
Modern computers include standard CD-ripping software, digital video re-
cording capabilities, cell phones with MP3 capabilities, iPods, and a dizzy-
ing array of technological innovations that have made the scope of the safe
harbor a new ocean beyond the imagination of the Court that reviewed the
video tape recorder in Sony.
While Grokster does not supplant either Sony or Napster, it harkens
back to Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,42
to enforce the copyright axiom that "one who, with knowledge of the in-
fringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer. 43
For those concerned about a pernicious creep of copyright liability,
one need only read Gershwin to put the scope of secondary liability in some
context:
[I]n Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp.
399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the district court held that an advertising agency which
placed non-infringing advertisements for the sale of infringing records, a radio sta-
tion which broadcast such advertisements and a packaging agent which shipped the
infringing records could each be held liable as a "contributory" infringer if it were
shown to have had knowledge, or reason to know, of the infringing nature of the
records. Their potential liability was predicated upon "the common law doctrine
37. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
38. Id. at 442.
39. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001).
40. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37.
41. Cohen, supra note 11, at 9-10.
42. 443 F.2d 1159 (2dCir. 1971).
43. Id. at 1162 (footnote omitted).
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that one who knowingly participates or furthers a tortious act is jointly and sever-
ally liable with the prime tortfeasor.
'
""
Under the decision in Grokster, one who traffics in black box software
designed to decrypt access protection or download protection is an infringer
under the current interpretation of vicarious liability. "[O]ne who distrib-
utes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster in-
fringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties."4
Sony dealt with a claim of liability based solely on distributing a product with al-
ternative lawful and unlawful uses, with knowledge that some users would follow
the unlawful course.... MGM's evidence in this case most obviously addresses a
different basis of liability for distributing a product open to alternative uses. Here,
evidence of the distributors' words and deeds going beyond distribution as such
shows a purpose to cause and profit from third-party acts of copyright infringe-
ment. If liability for inducing infringement is ultimately found, it will not be on
the basis of presuming or imputing fault, but from inferring a patently illegal objec-
tive from statements and actions showing what that objective was.
Section 1201 of the DMCA is consistent with Grokster and therefore
supported by the Supreme Court's view of infringement. While the extent
to which Sony has been modified by Grokster may be debatable, it does not
diminish the safe harbor for those creating substantially noninfringing prod-
ucts, nor does it necessarily return to the broad secondary liability rules of
Screen Gems-Columbia Music and Gershwin.
The DVD protection afforded by Corley has been extended to Macro-
vision's analog scrambling technology.47 In Macrovision, Sima was sued by
Macrovision to enjoin the use of anticircumvention technologies for its
software products "CopyThis!" and "GoDVD. '48 Macrovision's technology
adds a signal to DVDs that interferes with the video signal when recorded
on analog VHS tapes but does not affect the viewing of the DVD. Sima's
products disabled the Macrovision technology to allow analog copying of
the motion picture on the DVD.49
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found
that Sima was trafficking in devices that circumvent technological measures
in violation of § 1201 (a)(2). 0 It found that the primary purpose of the de-
44. Id. (quoting Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256
F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
45. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37.
46. Id. at 941.
47. Macrovision v. Sima Prods. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 5587, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22106 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2006).
48. Id. at *2.
49. Id. at *2-3.
50. Id. at *6 ("Sima is in violation of each prong of §1201(a)(2) of the DMCA, to
Macrovision's detriment.").
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vices was to circumvent the Macrovision anti-copying technology and
granted a preliminary injunction to bar the sale of the infringing products.
With both CSS and Macrovision adjudicated as protected by Section
1201, the statute has been a clear legal victory for the motion picture indus-
try. The court decisions assist the plaintiffs in enforcing the anti-copying
technology by using cease-and-desist letters and preliminary injunctions to
thwart manufacturers from profiting from the sale of these products.
In practice, such a legal victory has only marginal impact." The
power of search engines has made even prohibitions against linking a rather
pyrrhic victory. A search on Google reveals 1,010,000 hits for a search
using the term "DeCSS."52 The only difficult thing in the search was find-
ing a version of DeCSS that remains free. Prices for DVD "back up" pro-
grams and various rippers were typically low, but some were on sale for as
much as $99.00."3
The legal decisions may enable plaintiffs to search out the domestic
manufacturers of new software or hardware, but they hardly stem the tide
against the thousands of websites where these types of products are renamed
and re-released. International negotiators in 1996 could hardly have imag-
ined an Intemet-enabled world with millions of websites, peer-to-peer file
sharing, and connection speeds that make the sharing of full-length movies
commonplace. Against this technological backdrop, the positive legal im-
pact is clear but unconvincing.
51. Professor Julie Cohen has effectively made this point:
DMCA-style laws do not physically or electronically prevent the spread of unpro-
tected content or circumvention tools, and for that reason some critics consider
them ineffective. For example, the DMCA did not prevent the development and
widespread Internet distribution of DeCSS, the unauthorized program that decrypts
prerecorded DVDs. Even after successful and widely-publicized litigation against
several high-profile U.S. distributors of DeCSS, both the algorithm and movies de-
crypted with it remain widely available.
Cohen, supra note 11, at 8.
52. Search conducted by author September 12, 2007 on Google.com. In addition to
the 1,010,000 hits for "DeCSS," Google also estimated that "DeCSS Download" had
503,000 hits; "DeCSS Software" had 748,000 hits; and "DeCSS DVD" had 805,000 hits.
53. For example, a Google search resulted in a paid ad for www.soft4l 1.com. The
linked page posted eight products for sale ranging from $34.95 for the Amazon DVD
Shrinker to $99.95 for CloneDVD by X Software. See Decss, http://www.soft411.com/soft-
ware/decss.html (last visited May 4, 2008). Other sites do offer software for free. None of
the programs were downloaded or their promises verified.
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C. Undermining Rights Management: Using the DMCA to Block Competi-
tion-Corporate Misuse of Anticircumvention for Anticompetitive
Tricks
The success of the DMCA has not been without its own problems. If
the Act is merely a "speedbump" intended to slow mass infringement,54 then
it may have had little salutary value. The history of the statute focused on
the entertainment and software industries' need to protect their primary
revenue stream from theft. The statute was generally opposed by academics
who feared the chilling effect that effective content control could have on
the public.5 The debate simply did not extend to product manufacturers
who have incidental software embedded in their products. 6
As was feared when the DMCA was being debated, the problem is
less that piracy is being attacked with additional tools than that the tools can
be used to chill legitimate competition and academic inquiry. As I wrote
when the statute was first being debated:
[The statute] will deter code breaking of computer games and add additional crimi-
nal penalties against hackers. This will also discourage game enthusiasts from
sharing computer game passwords by making all the parties liable for copyright in-
fringement. Taking the law only a small step further, this will also give each
twelve-year-old legal redress against anyone reading his or her diary without per-
mission, so long as it has a lock or a password. 7
54. Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair
Use, 20 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 49, 59 (2006).
55. Doris Estelle Long, "Electronic Voting Rights and the DMCA: Another Blast
from the Digital Pirates or a Final Wake Up Call for Reform?", 23 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 533, 549-50 (2005); Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infra-
structure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 41, 54-70 (2001); Rebecca
Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with
Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation,
42 B.C. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (2000).
56. Product manufacturers had been intentionally removed from consideration in the
contemporaneous discussions of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA). Section 103 provides:
If a copy of a computer program is contained in and sold or leased as part of goods,
this [Act] applies to the copy and the computer program only if: (A) the goods are
a computer or computer peripheral; or (B) giving the buyer or lessee of the goods
access to or use of the program is ordinarily a material purpose of transactions in
goods of the type sold or leased.
UCITA, § 103(b)(1) (2002), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/-
ucita200.htm. The model statute also excluded financial services, broadcast content, and
other non-software agreements. While the UCITA evolved into a rather anti-consumer pro-
posal, drafters were more prescient about the potential ramifications regarding overlap be-
tween industries than the WIPO treaty participants.
57. Jon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the Conver-
gence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 537 (1999) (footnote
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When I wrote about the potentially overbroad use of anticircumven-
tion technology, I continued to consider the protection of content, albeit of a
very low-tech nature. I had not fully realized the extent to which companies
would use the provisions to embed encryption into their products-or de-
clare the software in their products to be encryption. This has led to a mis-
use of the statute that is potentially far more serious than academic concerns
regarding encryption.
The leading cases involving anticircumvention technology, therefore,
are not the cases brought by the entertainment and software companies
against piratical activities, but are manufacturing disputes about product
compatibility and after-market sales. The consumer products industries
were given a jolt when Lexmark,8 the maker of computer printers, and
Chamberlain,59 the manufacturer of electric garage door openers, each
brought an action under the DMCA to stop competitors from using aspects
of the software embedded in their products. Although ultimately the courts
of appeal hearing these cases rejected the use of the DMCA as a tool to stop
competitors from selling compatible products, the two decisions are simply
too tentative and narrow to forestall many more attempts of a similar nature.
In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., the
printer manufacturer attempted to use "Toner Loading Program," the toner
cartridge software designed to check fill levels, and the "Printer Engine
Program," which operated as the printer's operating software, to trigger the
anticircumvention provisions of Section 1201.' The defendants sold toner
cartridge computer chips to make the Lexmark toner cartridges eligible to
be refilled. Initially, the district court granted a preliminary injunction
omitted). I have always had trepidations about the last statement in this article because I
deleted the adjective "digital" from lock. The statute explains:
to "circumvent a technological measure" means to descramble a scrambled work,
to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or
impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner; and.
. a technological measure "effectively controls access to a work" if the measure,
in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a
process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to
the work.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3) (2000). While it seems that encryption is required, the phrase "oth-
erwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair" could include a simple mechanical
lock. Id. Since turning a key is a process, I continue to reluctantly stand by my original
statement in hope that a court will narrow this language before my own children begin keep-
ing secret diaries.
58. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir.
2004).
59. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
60. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 529.
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against Static Control Components (SCC), the defendant." As the court
explained,
[t]he authentication sequence that occurs between Lexmark's printers and the mi-
crochips contained on authorized Lexmark toner cartridges constitutes a "techno-
logical measure" that "controls access" to a copyrighted work. This authentication
sequence requires the application of information and the application of a process to
gain access to Lexmark's copyrighted Toner Loading Programs and Printer Engine
Programs.
62
At one level, the district court was entirely correct. The Toner Load-
ing Program was necessary to run and operate the printer, and it was a tech-
nological measure controlling access to the printer. The Sixth Circuit
pointed out that the two programs were not interrelated and that the Toner
Loading Program was not needed to gain access to the Printer Engine Pro-
gram; thus, it was not an effective control for anything.63
While it was true that Lexmark had not written the Toner Loading
Program as an encryption program, nothing is to stop a manufacturer of one
product from writing encryption into a second product.' The Lexmark
Court of Appeals was troubled by the paths its opinion left open for more
enterprising plaintiffs:
Nowhere in its deliberations over the DMCA did Congress express an interest in
creating liability for the circumvention of technological measures designed to pre-
vent consumers from using consumer goods while leaving the copyrightable con-
tent of a work unprotected. In fact, Congress added the interoperability provision
in part to ensure that the DMCA would not diminish the benefit to consumers of
interoperable devices "in the consumer electronics environment."
65
The Sixth Circuit went a small step further, quoting the testimony of
Professor Jane Ginsburg that "Section 1201(a) does not 'cover[] the cir-
cumvention of a technological measure that controls access to a work not
protected under [the Copyright] title. And if we're talking about ball point
pen cartridges, printer cartridges, garage doors and so forth, we're talking
about works not protected under this title."'
66
61. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 974
(E.D. Ky. 2003).
62. Id. at 967-68.
63. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 549.
64. See, e.g., Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercont'l, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 135
(N.D. Ohio 1986) (copyright in Teddy Ruxpin talking bear extended to interaction with the
cassettes played in the bear, so compatible cassettes were deemed infringing, and the per-
formance of the animatronic bear was an unauthorized derivative work).
65. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 549 (quoting 144 CONG. REC. E2136 (daily ed. Oct. 13,
1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley)).
66. Id. (quoting Anti-Circumvention Rulemaking Hearing, Copyright Office (2003)
(testimony of Professor Jane Ginsburg), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/-
hearings/transcript-may9.pdf).
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Writing in concurrence, Judge Merritt emphasized the need for courts
to go beyond narrow, technical interpretations and eliminate the DMCA as a
shield for manufacturers to delay legitimate competition:
We should make clear that in the future companies like Lexmark cannot use the
DMCA in conjunction with copyright law to create monopolies of manufactured
goods for themselves just by tweaking the facts of this case .... The crucial point
is that the DMCA forbids anyone from trafficking in any technology that "is pri-
marily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a [protected] work." 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(2)(A) (emphasis added). The key question is the "purpose" of the circum-
vention technology.
67
The concurrence identified the central issue at stake in these anticom-
petitive "shield" cases. Courts must look to the copyright law as a body to
determine whether the protected item is a copyrightable work or a commer-
cial product with embedded software. While this approach will admittedly
continue to require some line drawing, the line will be much more respectful
of the consumer's interest than the current analysis permits.
The Federal Circuit has addressed these concerns both in Chamberlain
and more recently in Storage Technology Corp. v. Custom Hardware Engi-
neering & Consulting, Inc.68 In Chamberlain, the court moved in the direc-
tion of the Lexmark concurrence by stating that Section 1201 "prohibits
only forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections
that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners."69 The court
returned to the increasingly familiar concept that plaintiffs "must prove that
the circumvention of the technological measure either 'infringes or facili-
tates infringing a right protected by the Copyright Act.'" 70 The Federal Cir-
cuit in Chamberlain and Storage Technology Corp. did not, however, em-
brace the notion that the work must be within the framework of copyright as
a whole as suggested by Professor Ginsburg.7
If a new standard can be fashioned from these cases, then I suggest
that it could be formulated rather simply as, "A product, when taken as a
whole, is substantially a work protected by copyright." Such items could be
known as "DMCA Works" to reflect that the copyrighted elements enumer-
ated by Section 1202 of the Copyright Act dominate the characteristic of the
product.72
67. Id. at 551-52 (Merritt, J., concurring).
68. 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, 431 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
69. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir.
2004). See also Storage Tech. Corp, 421 F.3d at 1318.
70. Storage Tech. Corp, 421 F.3d at 1318 (quoting Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1203).
71. Anti-Circumvention Rulemaking Hearing, supra note 66.
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
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Such a standard can be supported by the congressional testimony de-
scribed above73 so that consumer electronics and non-content goods are out-
side the scope of the DMCA shield. It should be noted that most goods
have copyrighted packaging, labeling, instructions, or other elements that
are part of any consumer transaction, but these copyrightable elements do
not transform the transaction into a consumer transaction for a copy of a
copyrighted work.74 The classes of works described in Section 1201(1)(B)
further support this interpretation. As the Copyright Office has explained:
The phrase "class of works" connotes that the shared, common attributes of the
"class" relate to the nature of authorship in the "works." Thus, a "class of works"
was intended to be a "narrow and focused subset of the broad categories of works
of authorship.., identified in section 102."75 The starting point for a proposed ex-
emption of a particular class of works must be the section 102 categories of author-
ship: literary works; musical 'works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreo-
graphic works; pictorial, graphic and sculptural works; motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; sound recordings; and architectural works.
7 6
If the Commerce Committee report and the Librarian of Congress both
limit works to those identified by Section 102, then the courts have ample
justification to limit Section 1201 to the software, music, film, audiovisual,
or literary works at issue in the WIPO treaties and the DMCA. The notion
that the statute must be limited to copyrighted works and not merely con-
sumer goods that have copyrighted elements can be supported by the legis-
lative history as well as the common sense of the more intuitive courts.
Static Control provided yet another formulation in its petition to the
Copyright Office to make consumer goods a class of works exempt from
Section 1201." Static Control suggested that Section 1201(a)(1)(A) exclude
oped .... Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works,
including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5)
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.
Id.
73. Anti-Circumvention Rulemaking Hearing, supra note 66.
74. But see Quality King Distribs. v. L'anza Research Int'l, 523 U.S. 135 (1998)
(use of label on hair products was the copyright interest used to attempt to stop parallel im-
portation of labeled goods; because the labels were lawfully made under U.S. copyright law,
the reimportation of the goods was protected by the first sale doctrine of § b 109(a)).
75. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 38 (1998), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 105_congreports&docid=f:hr55
lp2.105.pdf (Report of the House Committee on Commerce on the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998).
76. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 70 Fed. Reg. 57526, 57529 (Oct. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 201) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-55 1, supra note 75).
77. Petition of Static Control Components, Inc., In the Matter of Exemption to Pro-
hibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technolo-
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"[c]omputer programs embedded in a machine or product and that control
the operation of a machine or product connected thereto, but that do not
otherwise control the performance, display, or reproduction of copyrighted
works that have an independent economic significance[.]"78 Those works
that do not have an independent economic significance are presumably the
works that are embedded in goods where the consumer is acquiring the
good and the software is not the purpose of the transaction. It is another
way of saying that the product or good, taken as a whole, is not a protected
work because the economic value of the product or good is outside the
scope of copyright protection.
While I prefer the language that a work falls within the DMCA when
it is a "work protected by the Copyright Act" or "substantially falls under
the Copyright Act," rather than focusing on the independent economic sig-
nificance of the good, the approach remains the same. The DMCA is an
appropriate sword against piracy, black boxes, and anti-encryption software
aimed at the music, film, media, gaming, and software industries. It should
not be permitted to be wielded as a sword by one consumer product manu-
facturer against another.
There will undoubtedly continue to be line drawing involved to iden-
tify the boundary between DMCA works and consumer products. The retro
joysticks that are sold preprogrammed with five 1980s video games may be
the perfect example of a consumer good that is also a collection of audio-
visual works protected by copyright. But even in these technologically
revolutionary times, the hardware can generally be discerned from the soft-
ware and the television separated from the programming it plays.
I have no doubt that juries will discern the difference between the
shield of the DMCA and the misuse of the doctrine to protect snippets of
computer code from being embedded in noncreative products. Makers of
DVD players that decode the disc and enable the viewer to e-mail the con-
tent anywhere in the world will be enjoined. Juries will not grant relief to
manufacturers of high-tech lawn mowers that suddenly need software to
encrypt the "smart" spark plugs, oil filters, and disposable mulch bags that
can only be supplied by the lawn mower manufacturer. But jury trials are
expensive, and long litigation has a chilling impact on the marketplace.
Preliminary injunctions have the potential for great economic harm. The
language of the courts and Congress must streamline this process as quickly
as possible.
Perhaps the most useful aspect is the clarity the DMCA brings to the
ban on black box products, for this may be the one class of products that can
be reached only through the statute. The author of such an anticircumven-
gies, No. RM 2002-4 (Copyright Office Jan. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/petitions/static.pdf.
78. Id. at 1.
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tion device is directly and primarily liable under the various provisions of
Section 1201. Whether such a device is simple to create, the independent
use of Section 1201 has a place to discourage this type of piracy support.
For manufacturers of black box decrypters, there may be the ability to
write anti-encryption code that does not begin with a particular encryption
or utilize the software of a particular plaintiff. The result is that the defen-
dant never copies any copyrighted work of the plaintiff, yet can create and
traffic a program or device that others will use for widespread piracy.
While the very creation may result in liability under Grokster because the
creator and distributors have induced infringement, the anti-trafficking ap-
proach is much more explicit for retailers and others in the chain of distribu-
tion.
Similarly, all the wholesalers, retailers, and Internet vendors selling
the black box device are responsible for the "trafficking" of the device. To
the extent that the only effective method of impacting the manufacturer is to
eliminate the profit for those benefiting from such devices, this liability is
very helpful to the plaintiffs. Again, these resellers may be secondarily
liable under Grokster and Sony, but the statute adds clarity.
Perhaps the more interesting question is whether the fight against pi-
racy would be significantly different had Chapter 12 of the Copyright Act
not been adopted. Given the modest number of lawsuits and the defendant's
copyright infringement in every case, the likely answer is that piracy has not
been changed by either the anticircumvention provisions or the anti-
trafficking provisions. Particularly since traffickers are generally going to
be liable under Grokster, copyright law seems to have been perfectly capa-
ble of reaching all of the infringement impacted by Chapter 12. The statute
adds clarity, but the impact remains modest at best.
II. THE IWASTELAND
If Chapter 12 has added only modest benefit, then perhaps the costs do
outweigh the benefits. Professor Michael Geist reports that Bruce Lehman,
former commissioner of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, suggested
that the DMCA "'didn't work out very well."' 79 Lehman is quoted as say-
ing that "a new form of patronage will emerge with support coming from
79. Michael Geist, DMCA Architect Acknowledges Need for a New Approach, Mar.
23, 2007, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/1826/125/ ("The most interesting-and
surprising-presentation came from Bruce Lehman, who now heads the International Intel-
lectual Property Institute. Lehman explained the U.S. perspective in the early 1990s that led
to the DMCA (i.e.[,] greater control though TPMs), yet when reflecting on the success of the
DMCA acknowledged that 'our Clinton administration policies didn't work out very well'
and 'our attempts at copyright control have not been successful'...." ).
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industries that require music (webcasters, satellite radio) and government
funding., 0
The DMCA does work effectively to- ban black boxes and similar
forms of infringement since "the DMCA explicitly states that a violation of
the statute occurs when descrambling equipment circumvents a measure that
'effectively controls access' to a protected work. Measures based on en-
cryption or scrambling effectively control access to copyrighted works."'"
More importantly, the existence of DRM does not rely on the DMCA.
DRM allows an owner of a copyright to manage access to the content by
encrypting the content or locking the content behind passwords or other
protections. If DRM was wholly effective at stopping break-ins, then the
DMCA would be utterly superfluous since no potential pirate could ever
gain access to the protected content. No encryption system is sufficiently
robust, however, to avoid all break-ins, and audiovisual content needs to be
compatible with standard players; therefore, the encryption is often quite
easy to breach.82 "Copyright holders' deployment of DRM technologies
sparked an ongoing 'arms race' of sorts, with each successive technological
advance on one side being met by a response on the other."83
The legal regime should work equally well regardless of whether the
DMCA protects the encryption protocol or copyright protects the underlying
work. Unauthorized copying would be actionable. While the measure of
damages and criminal sanctions may vary,84 the essential liability would
remain.
A. Separating DRM from the DMCA
The practical difference between a DRM regime and an encryption-
free regime is one of convenience and conscience. Audiovisual works-
software, games, electronic books, DVDs, CDs, and similar media-are
more convenient for the consumer without any DRM but are much more
readily copied. For anyone who is ignorant or oblivious to the laws of
copyright, the physical difficulty in copying large works becomes a signifi-
80. Id.
81. Comcast of lll. X, LLC v. Hightech Elecs., Inc., No. 03 C 3231, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14619, at *17 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2004) (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). See also CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee, No.
05-107S, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86180 (D.R.I. Nov. 28, 2006); CSC Holdings, Inc. v.
Greenleaf Electronics, Inc., No. 99 C 7249, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7675 (N.D. Ill. June 1,
2000).
82. Armstrong, supra note 54. See Lee Kovarsky, A Technological Theory of the
Arms Race, 81 IND. L.J. 917 (2006).
83. Armstrong, supra note 54, at 61.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2000) (providing for a maximum $500,000 fine and five
years in prison for a first offense and twice those terms for subsequent offenses).
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cant barrier to copyright infringement. It would be far cheaper and easier to
purchase an out-of-print paperback than to photocopy the same book. 5
Conversely, before digital media, that which an individual could easily copy
was generally considered fair use. The law tracked the practical expansion
of technology, including photocopiers and videotape machines, to treat
these personal activities as fair use. 6
With the advent of digital technology, the correlation between conven-
ience and fair use no longer holds true. Entire audiovisual works can be
copied with relative ease. By clicking on a download button, a feature
length film can be copied to one's computer. I suspect that illegal copies of
most software programs, all commercially released CDs, and the majority of
theatrically released feature films can be found on the Internet. Conven-
ience no longer provides any guide to the public regarding the appropriate-
ness of its conduct.
In publishing, an important practical consideration is the willingness
of the audience to replace printed books with digital readers. The music
experience was enhanced by computers and portable devices. Improve-
ments in screen quality and better integration between televisions and com-
puter-based media centers are bridging the divide for film and television. In
contrast, online reading is still not as comfortable or convenient as paper-
backs. Sony is currently offering its new book reader in a combination
package of discounts that brings the retail price to $108.99, including a li-
brary of 100 classic (e.g., public domain) books.87 Public domain books are
also available for free through the Internet Archive,88 Project Gutenberg, 9
and the Million Book Project.9" The cost barrier has been or will be
breached this year. Amazon's Kindle has ignited strong interest in the tech-
nology.91 Whether the enhanced screen quality on Sony Reader, Apple's
85. At $0.05 per copy, a 400-page paperback would cost $10.00 to photocopy, as-
suming each photocopied page showed two pages from the book.
86. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 21-26 (rev. ed. 2003).
87. Sony, http://www.sony.com/reader (last visited May 4, 2008). The $349.00
retail is discounted by a $50.00 price reduction, $150.00 Sony "new card" member discount,
and $24.00 in rewards points. The public domain titles cost $1.99 to download. The dis-
count ran August 4, 2007 through September 30, 2007.
88. Internet Archive, www.archive.org (last visited May 4, 2008).
89. Project Gutenberg, www.gutenberg.org (last visited May 4, 2008).
90. The Universal Digital Library, www.ulib.org (last visited May 4, 2008).
91. Eric Benderoff, In Hand, the Kindle Proves Appealing, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10,
2007, at B5, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/technology/colunmists/chi-
montechbuzz_1210decl 0,0,848866.column.
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iPhone, or other current technologies has found the right mix remains to be
seen.
92
With every book or audiovisual product available online, DRM pro-
vides a reminder that the work should not be considered free for the taking.
DRM provides a heightened warning label that when one copies the work
without permission, one is breaking the law and stealing from the publisher.
DRM's primary impact serves as a tug on the consumer's conscience that
stealing a protected work is wrong. Ironically, the hue and cry surrounding
DRM might be the evidence of its effectiveness. Given the ease with which
DRM systems can be technologically circumvented, the legions of critics
must be reacting to the moral implications of rights management rather than
the impact DRM has on the availability of works.
If DRM cannot be sustained, then there exists a significant risk that
the ability to challenge the conscience of consumers will erode as well.
From that point forward, if DRM fails while the convenience of digital
copying continues unabated, then consumer behavior is unlikely to improve.
Instead, without DRM as a partial solution to illegal downloading, certain
media forms such as publishing, video games, and motion pictures may be
hurt in both finance and content.
Just as form follows function, content follows finance. Today the
Internet exists much as television once did during its golden age, but then,
as now, the fruits of artistic excellence were scattered across a wide land-
scape. FCC chairman Newton Minow's famous indictment still resonates
when he chided that "[W]hen television is bad, nothing is worse .... I can
assure you that you will observe a vast wasteland.""3 If the purveyors of
tomorrow's content see the profits of their industries erode, they will invest
less and take fewer risks on new artists. The artistic landscape will dry up,
and we risk returning to the same vast wasteland.
92. See Lee Gomes, Anything Is Possible: Like Actually Enjoying a Good Digital
Read, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Sept. 5, 2007, at BI, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1-
18895184627717552.html?mod=rssPortals.
93. Newton N. Minow, Television and the Public Interest, Speech Before the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961), in The Vast Wasteland Revisited, 55 FED.
COMM. L.J. 3, 398 (2003) (Symposium Issue), available at http://www.law.indi-
ana.edu/fclj/pubs/v55/no3/Speech.pdf ("But when television is bad, nothing is worse. I
invite you to sit down in front of your television set when your station goes on the air and
stay there without a book, magazine, newspaper, profit-and-loss sheet, or rating book to
distract you-and keep your eyes glued to that set until the station signs off. I can assure you
that you will observe a vast wasteland. You will see a procession of game shows, violence,
audience participation shows, formula comedies about totally unbelievable families, blood
and thunder, mayhem, violence, sadism, murder, Western badmen, Western good men, pri-
vate eyes, gangsters, more violence and cartoons. And, endlessly, commercials-many
screaming, cajoling and offending. And most of all, boredom. True, you will see a few
things you will enjoy. But they will be very, very few. And if you think I exaggerate, try
it.").
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To convey this admittedly bleak picture, I would like to illustrate the
artistic life of a person typical of my independent artist clients. In my case-
book,94 I have a recurring artist named Bryce." Bryce is a gifted artist, de-
veloping works in every conceivable media the book covers.96 For Bryce
the musician, DRM does more harm than good. Applied to only the minis-
cule portion of legally downloaded music, it ignores both CDs ripped to
MP3 players and the music files illegally traded on peer-to-peer software.97
Like a stop sign applying to only one of every hundred cars driving through
an intersection, DRM is an annoyance rather than a regulator. Steve Jobs
has correctly recommended that the sound recording industry should aban-
don DRM for music because it has never taken hold.98
But Bryce is worried about other media. Bryce's science fiction sto-
ries have all been posted to the Usenet. In fact, like Harlan Ellison and
other science fiction writers, Bryce can no longer be paid economically vi-
able fees to write science fiction short stories.99 Piracy has eroded the genre.
Massive novels like Harry Potter and Eragon remain in print, but short sto-
ries are moving from a professional to an amateur endeavor.
Noted author Jerry Pournelle described the situation in his blog:
I recent[ly] came across a web site that offered nearly every book Niven and I ever
wrote, along with Asimov and Heinlein and many others, free, in .doc format. His
defense was that he was making these works available to those who couldn't afford
them. And of course he was taking advertisements. The only content that would
attract people to his site was the copyrighted works of others.... Without some
kind of copyright protection no one will finance big movies, and even small mov-
ies are pretty expensive to make. Without some way to insure some return on time
invested, authors won't write long and crafted books. Writing good books is hard
work. It's less work to turn out pot boilers. It's less work to write copy for soup
companies.l°°
94. JON M. GARON, ENTERTAINMENT LAW & PRACTICE (2005).
95. Id. at 27 ("Meet Bryce. Bryce is a talented, up-and-coming artist-a hyphenate
actor, writer, singer, director and producer-in other words, a fairly typical young talent.
Throughout the course of the textbook, Bryce will engage in transactions involving the de-
velopment of new ideas into film, music, television, theatre, and computer-game projects.").
96. Id.
97. See Jobs, supra note 1; Deana Sobel, A Bite out of Apple? iTunes, Interoperabil-
ity, and France's Dadvsi Law, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 267, 281 (2007).
98. Jobs, supra note 1 ("Why would the big four music companies agree to let Ap-
ple and others distribute their music without using DRM systems to protect it? The simplest
answer is because DRMs haven't worked, and may never work, to halt music piracy.").
99. GARON, supra note 94, at 531-32 (To quote Harlan Ellison: "Hundreds of writ-
ers' stories, entire books, and the work of a lifetime, everyone from Isaac Asimov to Roger
Zelazny: Their work has been thrown onto the web by these smartass vandals who find it an
imposition to have to pay for the goods.").
100. Jerry Pournelle, Computing at Chaos Manor: December 19, 2006, The User's
Column, Column 317, pt. 3, available at http://www.chaosmanorreviews.com/op-
en.archives/jepcolumn-317-c.php.
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Many in the science fiction and the short story worlds, however, are
pleased by this explosion in access and distribution opportunity. Some of
them are willing to accept the cost associated with piracy to build readership
interest, or they philosophically dislike the economic model of the industry.
Charlie Cross, for example, has written eloquently that DRM is far more
damaging than piracy, and that piracy has had little impact on actual book
sales. "01
Moreover, the pressure Bryce has faced regarding the pay available
may not be caused by piracy but by the ability to self-publish and distribute
works on the Internet. The downward price pressure flows from the over-
abundance of available works, from both legitimate and pirated sources. As
the costs for publication of e-books and e-magazines have dropped, the
saturation of the market is no longer limited. Access to content is at an all-
time high:
Hundreds (if not thousands) of stories are published every year in the science fic-
tion and fantasy genres, in the professional magazines, in anthologies, as novella
chapbooks, in semiprozines, and as previously unpublished stories in single-author
collections, in addition to those "published" (we really need a new word for this!)
electronically ... and the brutal truth is that most of those hundreds of stories are
going to vanish without a trace and never be heard from again.'
0 2
The technology and the proliferation of access has exploded the
amount of content available, though it has not necessarily increased the
amount of content actually read. I expect that the readership value for well-
known authors remains much higher than for unknown authors. Readers
have little generic desire for content. Effective enforcement of DRM would
separate out the economically valuable content of highly-recognized authors
(who choose not to provide free distribution of their works) from the un-
known or new authors in the same free marketplace. If the publishing
world's economic structure is undermined by traffic in digitalized works
from pirated copies, then both the industry and the audience will suffer.0 3 If
instead, disintermediation and a surge in amateur, self-published, or start-up
101. The Charles Stross FAQ, http://www.antipope.org/charlie/fiction/faq.html (last
visited May 4, 2008) ("I believe the ebook market is finally showing signs of maturation
(with numerous cheap digital paper based readers due to arrive on the market in 2007-08),
and I'm going to do my best to ensure that cheap and/or DRM-free ebook editions of my
work are available wherever possible. (It is my opinion that DRM is immoral; it attempts to
shake down our shared cultural heritage for an access fee, and imposes limitations on use that
go far beyond the legal boundaries imposed by copyright law.)"). See also Charles Stross,
Charlie's Diary: Why the Commercial Ebook Market Is Broken, http://www.antipope.org/-
charlielblogstatic/2007/03/whythecommercialebookmarke.html (last visited May 4,
2008).
102. NEBULA AwARDs SHOWCASE 2006, at 1 (Gardner Dozois ed., 2006).
103. As with peer-to-peer file sharing, the relief was not sought against new artist
programs. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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publications challenge the economic status quo, then the public will have
spoken and the industry will have no choice but to respond.
What this suggests for the future of literature may be quite disconcert-
ing. The number of works published and self-published is at an all-time
high, while both reading and literacy are falling in the United States."°
Fewer than half of adults now read any form of literature." 5 That reflects a
ten percent or twenty-million person decline. 6 College-age readership was
down twenty percent, and the eighteen- to twenty-four age group was down
twenty-eight percent. 
0 7
B. Copyright as an Engine for Opportunity
If copyright enforcement continues to erode, so will the risks publish-
ers are willing to take. The impact is inevitable. "Authors may not actually
get rich, but eliminating the opportunity, the profit motive, the chance to hit
it big-that's going to eliminate good authors from even trying."'08
The risk in publishing is a vicious cycle:
[I]f publishers feel their profits are in jeopardy, they may pay lower advances (the
initial payment to an author, often all they ever receive for those rights). Good
writers, frustrated by their inability to make a living at this racket, will migrate to
technical writing, advertising, journalism, or any other profession where they can
use their talents to earn a living wage. So more and more of the "non-celebrity"
books will be by authors willing to settle for any advance, no matter how little.
And a general rule of thumb in any business is that the less you pay, the less-
qualified are your job applicants. Think what this means for [your] future reading
pleasure. 10 9
104. Publishing sales have remained steady at $10 billion annually in net sales based
on American Publishers Association data. See Book Business, 2006 Book Sales Remain
Steady at $10 Billion, Feb. 16, 2007, http://www.bookbusinessmag.com/story/storysingle-
pg.bsp?sid=47549&var=story ("Overall trade sales in the United States saw a .02 percent
year-over-year dip, or about $16.3 million less in 2006 compared with 2005 sales, the report
stated.").
105. National Endowment for the Arts News Room, Literary Reading in Dramatic
Decline, According to National Endowment for the Arts Survey (July 8, 2004),
http://www.nea.gov/news/news04/ReadingAtRisk.html.
106. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, READING AT RISK: A SURVEY OF
LITERARY READING IN AMERICA, RESEARCH Div. REP. No. 46, at ix, available at
http://www.nea.gov/news/niews04/ReadingAtRisk.html.
107. Id. at xi.
108. Science Fiction and Fantasy Writers of America, Inc., FAQ, Frequently Asked
Questions about Electronic Piracy (ePiracy), http://aburt.com/sfwa/epiracy-faq.html (last
visited May 4, 2008) [hereinafter Burt, SFWA] ("The views presented here are those of Dr.
Andrew Burt ... and the many committee members who contributed-not those of SFWA's
board of directors or of its membership, though many SFWAns share similar views, and their
comments have gone into the creation of this page.").
109. Id.
Spring]
Michigan State Law Review
As predicted by the economic concerns of the Science Fiction Writers
Association, potential writers such as Bryce are turning to other opportuni-
ties. Bryce does continue to write the occasional short story, earning either
$10.00-$25.00 per story or $0.01-0.05 per word, depending on the publica-
tion."0
Bryce turned to the stage, but professional theatre has been dying
since before I was born, so what does that say. Theatrical patronage, how-
ever, has changed. Most plays now originate in the nonprofit regional thea-
tres like the Guthrie, Steppenwolf, or Globe. Ticket prices have exceeded
$300.00"' in New York and transformed theatre to an artificial, elite experi-
ence more like opera. An elite, self-referential theatrical world is fine until
the audience evaporates.
At the professional theatre in St. Paul where I volunteer (not Bryce),
20,000 high school students get a chance to see Diary of Anne Frank, A
Midsummer Night's Dream, and other plays, many based on traditional high
school curricula. Often, this theatre trip is the only exposure these students
have had to the theatre, and often they will attend only if a patron of the
theatre can cover the cost for the production and the transportation. Many
school districts have abandoned this educational exercise. Whither goest
the Patron of the Arts for this generation?" 2
Discouraged by the opportunities in theatre, Bryce purchased a digital
camera and opened accounts on YouTube, MySpace, Atomfilms, iFilm, and
as many other sites as possible. A gifted writer and talented with the im-
agery of the medium, Bryce made both documentaries and films.
Bryce faced many challenges. The rough cut of a feature film in-
cluded a character wearing a tee-shirt of R2D2. A review by the lawyer
110. See generally SpecFic World Market Newsletter #29, available at
http://www.specficworld.com/downloads.aspx (last visited May 4, 2008) (listing publishers
and rates for science fiction and horror short stories).
11. See Campbell Robertson, Broadway's New Math: Top Dollars Equals Sales,
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2006, at El.
112. Dr. Burt of the Science Fiction Writers Association is more apoplectic than I am
on the role of patronage. As with the school trip example, there will be many examples of
beneficial patronage. Still, the long-term consequence of turning over the funding of content
to a non-commercial and self-appointed elite or the government has dangerous implications
and socially undesirable consequences:
Some pirates recommend returning to patronage-artists being sponsored by rich
and powerful individuals or institutions. You want only fiction written that Bill
Gates approves of? Only Republican or Democrat approved stories should be al-
lowed? The founding fathers of the US were trying specifically to avoid this when
they established the copyright protection system-it's what was used for a long
time throughout Europe and felt to be stifling of new ideas. They wanted authors
and inventors to be rewarded for their individual effort without control imposed on
them by the rich and powerful. Stifling control by the rich and powerful is what
the pirates are complaining about!
Burt, SFWA, supra note 108.
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explained that the copyrighted and trademarked image could not be used in
the feature film without a license. But then the director of the "making of'
documentary about Bryce's efforts in making a first feature film asked a
question. "Bryce just wasted three days of shooting because of this Star
Wars tee-shirt. Surely I can keep that scene in my documentary?"
The answer, of course, is less than clear. A review of cases suggests
no litigation has occurred involving television or documentary films and the
copyrights displayed on people's clothing."' Arguably, documentary films
are more newsworthy in nature and would receive a broader fair use privi-
lege, "4 but such an assertion is not specifically quantified." 5 So the advice
would allow the documentary to film the removal of the shirt from the fic-
tional film.
If instead, the offending content were a ring tone or sudden moment of
spontaneous song in the documentary, the pressure to seek a license would
be much higher due to the more rigorous licensing practices for music. For
sound recordings, there has become less and less fair use. Documentary
filmmakers regularly face challenges for clearing incidental uses of music,
often at very high costs." 6 A six-second clip of a ringtone rendition of
"Gonna Fly Now" from Rocky was licensed for $2,500-down from the
$10,000 asking price noted in a documentary film about elementary school
students."7
Licensing fee increases have been considered an economic response to
consumer piracy. They allow the producers of content to recoup revenues at
the choke point in the marketplace. A professional publisher or producer is
much easier to identify and license or enjoin than the millions of consumers
downloading without authorization. The shift in emphasis, unfortunately,
harms the creation of new work, adding expense and discouraging creative
cultural commentary.
Bullied by the challenges of licensing and the lack of markets for fea-
ture-length content, Bryce felt defeated. Most websites merely create op-
113. Search of Lexis Federal and State Cases database (conducted Aug. 31, 2007).
Regarding set decorations (in fictional works), compare Ringgold v. Black Entertainment
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997), with Jackson v. Warner Brothers, Inc., 993 F.
Supp. 585 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
114. See Monster Commc'ns, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
115. 17. U.S.C. § 107 (2000) ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work... for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for class-
room use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright."). See Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985).
116. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,
116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007).
117. Nancy Ramsey, The Hidden Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 2005,
§ 2, at 13; Gibson, supra note 116, at 893.
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portunities to post user content,"' but some even offered compensation for
Bryce based on the hits to the posted films.' But few viewers would watch
an hour-long documentary or a ninety-minute film, even with a talented
professional cast.
Bryce, however, was eventually successful.
Bryce is creative and clever. Bryce understands the economics of the
Internet and the burgeoning new medium. As a result, Bryce's postings
have become shorter and shorter. The clips are now under three minutes
long. Usually they are just staged pratfalls. Bryce's original band is often
featured lighting various props on fire and running away. They are some-
times funny and sometimes clever, and Bryce has started featuring con-
sumer products in the clips. Bryce gets paid on the side for that.2 '
If Bryce can be successful, then perhaps the fear of cataclysm and aes-
thetic collapse is overstated:
Though today's movie industry may falter, we now have significant evidence that
firms and industries are no longer necessary for the creation of extraordinarily
complicated and otherwise expensive creative objects. Open source software...
provides the model for distributed production of complex creative objects ....
There are, by now, a sufficient number of examples of this type of open source
creativity, in areas including software, newspapers, and commentary, for us to con-
clude that this type of organization can supplant the firm in the production of com-
plex creative objects.' 21
Of course, this observation is correct, but at least thus far the excep-
tional explosion of talent and attention to YouTube.com and other film sites
has resulted in a massive increase in the number of clips created, rather than
in any collaborative, socially-networked motion pictures. Certainly there
are ways to create a "story bible" in which various filmmakers each take
aspects of the story to tell, which is then publicly distributed. Set against
the common backdrop of an interesting plot and premise, such an experi-
ment could yield wonderful results. 22 But this would not replace traditional
filmmaking.
118. See, for example, Spike, http://www.spike.com/ (last visited May 4, 2008);
AtomFilms, atomfilms.com (last visited May 4, 2008); YouTube, youtube.com (last visited
May 4, 2008).
119. E.g., Metacafe, What is Producer Rewards?, http://www.metacafe.com/prod-
ucer rewards/) (last visited May 4, 2008).
120. Bryce started working on a video game, but the source code was posted to the
net while the game was in beta. The game is quite popular, I'm told, but no publisher will
distribute what it views as an open source product. Of course, it was not open source when
Bryce designed it, but the software has been mirrored on too many sites.
121. Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 951, 1016-17 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
122. To elaborate further: the project would be based on a particular story such as the
legend of King Arthur. To create a socially networked media experience, an open invitation
to filmmakers would encourage each to tell the story from the perspective of a character
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While it is unfair to suggest that disintermediated filmmaking will
never develop simply because it has not developed yet, the highly sophisti-
cated and heavily interdisciplinary nature of the craft suggests that it will
not readily lend itself to the iterative and collaborative process of software
development. Both filmmaking and software development may be com-
plex, but their methodologies bear little in common.
Bryce, of course, remains hopeful. One possibility is that the short
works are allowing Bryce to learn the craft of filmmaking and encapsulate
stories into the compressed time frame of the Internet Webisode or clip. As
a medium, the short clip does create an opportunity for practice, but critics
are yet to embrace it even for the commercial hits:123
The Webisode is to network television what an M&M's Mini is to candy: it can
please, but can't satisfy .... Someday soon, all television will be available on cell
phones, iPods and laptops, and a better balance between content and commercials
will presumably be found. Right now, network Web sites are a piercing shriek of
visual noise.
124
None of this activity, however, has earned Bryce enough money to
pay even the legal fees associated with the production costs.
III. PATRONAGE REVISITED-IS EVERYTHING OLD NEW AGAIN?
As indicated earlier, the worst-case scenario faced by Bryce represents
an apocryphal world where the failure of DRM equates with the failure of
copyright. Copyright will not utterly fail. Instead, laws will continue to
protect against commercial exploitation by identifiable publishers because
the source of the infringement can be found. The benefits of statutory dam-
ages and attorneys' fees for registered works will continue to provide a suf-
ficient economic reward to bring copyright claims against any party with the
means to satisfy the judgment.
The failure of DRM creates an inherent assumption that the law is in-
sufficient to stop "noncommercial" piracy, peer-to-peer systems, overseas
websites, and other methods of distributing content in a manner that makes
cease-and-desist actions a shell game. In consequence, the rights holders
will continue to emphasize license fees where commercial publishers and
distributors are required to pay. Fees for ringtones, musical licenses for
films and documentaries, and other non-consumer transactions will continue
known in the legend, including all the knights, those vanquished, Merlin and all those with
whom he interacted during his lifetime living backwards through time, etc. The immersive
story could grow indefinitely, like fan fiction relating to a literary character.
123. Alessandra Stanley, NBC's Web-Only Episodes Offer 'The Office,' a Little at a
Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2006, at E6.
124. Id.
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to play an increasingly pivotal role in the economics of the entertainment
industries.
A. Revisiting the Economic Underpinnings of Entertainment
The question remains whether the available revenue streams will be
sufficient to sustain the consumer-market model for content, whether adver-
tising is preferential, or whether a return to a patronage is likely.'25 Not all
the entertainment fields use the same model, so a more accurate description
of the future will include a shift in emphasis among the economic models
rather than any cataclysmic collapse of consumer sales. Assuming media
content will remain a professional pursuit in which the artists and authors
arc economically rewarded, there are only a few sources for the revenue.
The first U.S. model for content financing is direct consumer purchas-
ing. At one extreme, a market may be entirely consumer driven, so that all
revenue is derived through ticket purchases and product purchases. Argua-
bly, this model should be most responsive to the public market because it
economically rewards only that for which the public is willing to pay.
The second financing model is advertising-based funding, a variation
on consumer payment. Through advertising-supported consumer consump-
tion, advertisers pay for access to the audience as it watches, listens, or par-
ticipates in the medium. The consumer does not pay directly for the con-
tent, but independent measures of consumer behavior help the industry set
the value of the advertising. The public ultimately pays for the cost of con-
tent as the cost of advertising is added to the charges for products and ser-
vices. In the case of broadcast radio and over-the-air television, all revenue
is advertising-derived, and the audience pays nothing for the content it re-
ceives.
Magazine publishers use a combination of consumer purchasing and
paid advertising to earn their income, reducing but not eliminating the direct
cost for the consumer. Cable television and satellite radio are similar, but
not the same as the magazine medium. In the case of the cable and satellite
broadcasters, the consumer is paying for access to a wide range of content
rather than paying for a particular channel or show. The payment shows the
willingness of the consumer to receive the medium but not any particular
message.
A third but minor source of existing funding comes from federal and
state governments.'26 This source is much more significant in other coun-
tries, where the state has official television networks, radio stations, or
125. See generally Note, Exploitative Publishers, Untrustworthy Systems, and the
Dream of a Digital Revolution for Artists, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2438, 2440-41 (2001).
126. See Jennifer Weatherup, Agencies and the Arts: The Dilemma of Subsidizing
Expression, 24 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGEs 271, 272-73 (2004).
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newspapers.'2 7 Nonetheless, the United States does have the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting, a nonprofit entity created by Congress.'28 In addi-
tion, grants from the National Endowment for the Arts, the National En-
dowment for the Humanities, and state-funded agencies comprise part of the
funding landscape for arts, entertainment, and culture in the United States.
While there is no direct conflict with the free speech rights embodied
in the Constitution, 29 governmental funding of content necessarily puts the
government in the role of selecting or preferring editorial content. 3 ° For
"although the First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy con-
text, we note that the [g]overnment may allocate competitive funding ac-
cording to criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of
speech or a criminal penalty at stake."'' Despite this assertion that gov-
ernmental funding gives Congress wide latitude, there has at least been rec-
ognition by the U.S. Supreme Court that such latitude should come with
some respect for the ideals in the First Amendment:
When Congress first decided to provide financial support for the expansion and
development of noncommercial educational stations, all concerned agreed that this
step posed some risk that these traditionally independent stations might be pres-
sured into becoming forums devoted solely to programming and views that were
acceptable to the Federal Government. That Congress was alert to these dangers
cannot be doubted. It sought through the Public Broadcasting Act to fashion a sys-
tem that would provide local stations with sufficient funds to foster their growth
and development while preserving their tradition of autonomy and community-
orientation. A cardinal objective of the Act was the establishment of a private cor-
poration that would "facilitate the development of educational radio and television
broadcasting and.., afford maximum protection to such broadcasting from extra-
neous interference and control.'
32
127. See Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and Bridging Divides: The Failure
and Redemption ofAmerican Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 1,
9 (2004); Thomas M. Murray, The U.S.-French Dispute Over GATT Treatment of Audiovis-
ual Products and the Limits of Public Choice Theory: How an Efficient Market Solution was
"Rent-Seeking", 21 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 203, 207 (1997).
128. 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (2000).
129. Nat'l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding content-
based requirement that decency and respect be considered in NEA grants).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (allowing
filtering software requirements in public libraries); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468
U.S. 364 (1984) (barring prohibition on political editorials); Regan v. Taxation with Repre-
sentation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (upholding prohibition on lobbying activities
by tax-exempt entities).
131. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587-88.
132. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 386-87 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(6)
(1976)).
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In recent years, however, Congress has not sought to immunize itself
from the temptation to use appropriations to affect the public discourse.113
These tendencies tend to rise and fall with the controversy of the day, but
over time, the inevitable impact of funding is to shift the focus of content
toward the interest of the funding source. Even if laws such as those de-
scribed for the Corporation of Public Broadcasting are in place, there will be
an inevitable interrelationship between content and the funding source.
Inevitably, if governmental funding-or even governmental control
over rates and disbursements-becomes the dominant force in the remu-
neration system, it will affect the content.'34 A system of direct government
funding for media will not be secure from government control of the content
produced thereunder.
The fourth source of funding is from private patronage. Charitable
tax-exempt organizations collect private donations for visual art, theatre,
opera, libraries, motion pictures, public broadcasting, and publishing en-
deavors of various kinds. Private patronage already pervades the noncom-
mercial side of the entertainment industry. Because it is charitable or non-
profit under our tax codes, it is lumped together with religious and educa-
tional beneficence.'35 Private patronage has always been part of the art
scene, arguably the engine behind the avant garde and an important part of
innovation in arts and culture. The donors are often the great families in
each community, lending both their names and their resources to the cul-
tural vibrancy of their communities.
Today, many of these same families participate on the commercial
side as well, dabbling in film funding because they have the financial capac-
ity to take losses that come far more often than the gains. Assuming that the
wealthy patrons reflect a reasonable cross-section of the public, then the
generosity of these patrons may result in content not wholly different than
the content created by commercial reinforcement. Of course, this assump-
tion may be inaccurate. Potentially, the incentives to fund media will be
directed to more "important" or socially desirable works, so the content
133. See Richard J. Peltz, Pieces of Pico: Saving Intellectual Freedom in the Public
School Library, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 103 (2005); Arthur N. Eisenberg, The Brooklyn
Museum Controversy and the Issue of Government-Funded Expression, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
275 (2000); Lee C. Bollinger, Public Institutions of Culture and the First Amendment: The
New Frontier, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1103 (1995).
134. See Weatherup, supra note 126, at 303-04. See also Brenda L. Tofte, Note,
"Baby, It's Cold Outside: " The Chilling Effect of the Decency Clause on the Arts in the
Aftermath of National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 22 HAMLrNE L. REv. 303, 314
(1998).
135. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) ("Corporations ... organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educa-
tional purposes ....").
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funded will be more erudite than the content funded with advertising or
direct consumer purchases.
The Harlequin Romance is less likely to receive donor funding than
the literary novel. Of course, public television trends suggest that shows
such as Great Performances have been supplanted with reunion specials of
folk and pop stars from the previous generation. If this is the real trend,
then the socially desirable and funded content will simply skew on the older
side, following the demographics of wealth.
Finally, a fifth category of financing has emerged that builds upon the
intersection of advertising and patronage. Under the "distributor funding"
model, consumer electronics companies and telecommunications companies
rely on the desirability of content to fuel the sale of products and services.
Companies like Apple, Intel, Microsoft, Dell, or HP; integrated companies
like Sony and TimeWarner; and telecommunications backbone companies
like Comcast and AT&T remain hungry for content.
Distributor funding focuses exclusively on popularity without regard
to quality. These companies have no structural need to care about either the
quality or the message of the shows promoting their advertisements; they
only need the content to flow through their pipelines and onto the devices
they sell. Just as Gillette once famously discounted razors to sell razor
blades, these companies will give away content so long as we buy the ma-
chines and subscribe to the delivery services. Perhaps popularity is suffi-
cient and society need not concern itself with other measures of quality, but
I can think of few works today that compare favorably with the quality of
television in 1961 when Newton Minow called television the great waste-
land.
136
Distributor funding will emphasize the quantity of content available
over the quality. Time spent using the distributor's service to find artistic
needles in the haystack will not matter, because so long as the audience is
engaged, the distributor benefits. YouTube is an example of a business that
supports both Google (its owner) and the internet service providers that pro-
mote audience interaction with the service. Some of the content is funny,
some is fascinating, and the medium will only undoubtedly mature over
time. But the economic model relies on participation rather than quality.
This may not be significantly different from the advertising model.'37 While
136. Minow, supra note 93.
137. A small but potentially significant distinction between advertising and distribu-
tor supported content is the association made with the underlying material. An advertiser
generally tries to associate itself with positive aspects of the content in which its commercials
are aired. A distributor, in contrast, is responsible for all the content available on its network,
so it is unable to claim any benefit for higher quality content. So a cable company has even
less incentive than an advertiser to be concerned about the nature of the content generating
the revenue from its customers.
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there is some brand development for premium brands that wish to be asso-
ciated with more refined content (particularly in magazine advertising),
most radio and television advertising focuses on market size. As such, the
distribution funding model is merely an extension of the advertising model.
In television, HBO represents a consumer-payer model, while broad-
cast television represents the advertising model. Most cable channels reflect
the mixed model of consumer payment, distributor funding, and advertising.
The mix of economics varies from channel to channel.
B. Balancing the Models for Entertainment Funding
In legitimate theatre, including Broadway, off-Broadway, and other
professional theatre, the models are highly mixed. A new musical may be
developed at a nonprofit, regional theatre where the theatre's budget is ap-
proximately fifty percent ticket sales and fifty percent charitable dona-
tions.'38 That same musical could open in a for-profit theatre on Broadway.
A non-musical play could do the same, but it is far less likely that the play
would be economically viable on Broadway. Other plays and musicals,
however, which might be produced in nonprofit theatres, would never be
commercially viable in New York's for-profit marketplace. Moreover, most
markets have no for-profit theatre at all. Of those that do, the for-profit
entities do not produce original plays or musicals. Instead, they book tour-
ing companies that play for a few days or a week in that location before
moving on to the next city. Disney has further blurred the distinction as the
only theatrical producer that integrates musical theatre with film, television,
and other entertainment products.
Live theatre continues to flourish in the United States as a result of the
mixture of donor-supported patronage augmented by Broadway's commer-
cial producers. More realistically, even Broadway should be described as a
patronage system. Although the investors do not receive a charitable deduc-
tion for their investments, the industry term of "angels" reflects their altruis-
tic or personal motivation, rather than realistic commercial goals. The an-
gels of Broadway are more accurately depicted as the modem Medicis, in-
vesting in the art as a quasi-commercial exercise in culture and influence.
Through their beneficence, they keep legitimate theatre away from the elitist
isolation of opera even as the non-commercial donors veer it away from the
mere spectacle of the modem circus.
138. ZANNIE GIRAuD Voss & GLENN B. Voss, THEATRE FACTS 2006, A REPORT ON
PRACTICES AND PERFORMANCE IN THE AMERICAN NOT-FOR-PROFIT THEATRE BASED ON THE
ANNUAL TCG FISCAL SURVEY 2, 4 fig.2 (2006), available at http://www.tcg.org/to-
ols/facts/index.cfm (reporting an average of 52% earned income and 48% contributions for
its 1,893 reporting theatres).
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Since the public has become quite familiar with the patronage model,
we assume it works well. The art form balances "popular" comedies with
"important" dramas. Theatres add perennial Christmas favorites or popular
musicals to infuse the annual production budgets. Through this balance, the
theatrical season responds in a generally acceptable manner to both audi-
ence and patron expectations. So despite concerns that we abandon con-
sumer payment in content for an entirely patron- or consumer-electronics-
funded system, the reality is that most media have a mix of consumer pay-
ment, advertising, patronage, government, and-increasingly-
underwriting by consumer electronics/telecommunications distributors. A
change in emphasis will result in a change in the nature of the content being
produced, but the benefits or detriments of such a chance are unclear and
likely unknowable.
Does this mean that my concern for Bryce is unfounded? Unfortu-
nately not. The opportunity for Bryce to flourish in the new landscape con-
tinues, but the wasteland will spread if the funding sources do not value
quality as one of the parameters. Perhaps the current advertising model has
already pushed society down that slippery slope, but the speed of descent
will only accelerate if telecommunications companies and consumer elec-
tronics concerns continue to tout quantity over quality, and if the true mod-
erating control of direct consumer spending is eliminated.
A more elitist view would suggest that the emphasis should shift to pa-
tronage and the nonprofit donor as the preferred source of funding. But this,
too, distorts the content. Perhaps donor funding enriches it, but nonetheless
such funding changes the content available to the public and, by conse-
quence, which authors and artists we will support.
So long as audience members pay for content, they play a critical role.
They insist that the dollars they spend go to content worth reading and
viewing. Even with television, there is a difference between television rat-
ings and purchases of videotapes/DVDs of previously broadcast content. I
believe that this reflects the qualitative difference between what we are will-
ing to occasionally watch and the content in which we will invest, sub-
scribe, and keep. The regional theatre model of a balance between audience
ticket sales and donor funding keeps the demands of the audience and the
donors in a healthy tension, placing a premium on content that can meet
these twin goals.
C. Expropriating Patrons--Ownership by EULA
Bryce faced one additional hurdle. Attempting to be creative, Bryce
created a minstrel character for World of Warcraft, a massive multiplayer
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online game.'39 Unfortunately, the game was not well-suited to Bryce's
musical musings. A friend tried to help Bryce by copying the character to
an "open access" version of the game to allow Bryce to move the character
to another game. Bryce's friend tried to "open" the game so as to allow him
to edit Bryce's character. In doing so, he triggered yet another of the prob-
lems inherent with the DMCA-the intersection between the statute and
licensing agreement associated with the protected software.
End user license agreements (EULA) and terms of use agreements
(TOU) set the terms and conditions for access to the content of digital me-
dia. These license agreements can go well beyond the safeguards built into
the DMCA to reduce the interoperability of software and otherwise change
the policy balance woven throughout the Copyright Act by often requiring
that all user-created content be the intellectual property of the game pub-
lisher."4
In Davidson & Associates v. Jung,' the Eighth Circuit reviewed the
role of an EULA in the context of the DMCA. The agreement in question
was carefully written and executed. The language in the shrinkwrap and
clickwrap agreement was as follows:
YOU SHOULD CAREFULLY READ THE FOLLOWING END USER LICENSE
AGREEMENT BEFORE INSTALLING THIS SOFTWARE PROGRAM. BY
INSTALLING, COPYING, OR OTHER WISE USING THE SOFTWARE
PROGRAM YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THIS
AGREEMENT. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS
AGREEMENT, PROMPTLY RETURN THE UNUSED SOFTWARE
PROGRAM TO THE PLACE OF PURCHASE OR CONTACT BLIZZARD
ENTERTAINMENT CUSTOMER SERVICE . .. FOR A FULL REFUND OF
THE PURCHASE PRICE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF THE ORIGINAL
PURCHASE.
This software program (the "Program"), any printed materials, any on-line or elec-
tronic documentation, and any and all copies and derivative works of such software
program and materials are the copyrighted work of Blizzard Entertainment....
Subject to that Grant of Licence [sic] hereinabove, you may not, in whole or in
part, copy, photocopy, reproduce, translate, reverse engineer, derive source code,
modify, disassemble, decompile, create derivative works based on the Program, or
remove any proprietary notices or labels on the Program without the prior consent,
in writing, of Blizzard.1
42
139. World of Warcraft, http://www.worldofwarcraft.comlindex.xml (last visited
May 4, 2008).
140. See Andrew Jankowich, EULA W: The Complex Web of Corporate Rule-Making
in Virtual Worlds, 8 TuL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 37 (2006); Robert L. Oakley, Fairness
in Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 Hous. L.
REV. 1041, 1049 (2005).
141. 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
142. Id. at 635.
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The language of the license effectively prohibited a wide variety of
conduct for the material, most of which is already prohibited by copyright
or trademark law. The agreement cleverly and effectively provided the end
user with a method of unwinding the transaction in the event that the terms
were not anticipated prior to installation. The inclusion of the language in
the installation and the packaging eliminated virtually all possible claims
that the end purchaser acquired the software free of the agreement. As a
result, the EULA represents thoughtful and careful advocacy on behalf of
Blizzard Entertainment,'43 the gaming company that used this language as
part of its launch of Battle.net.
Blizzard was also conscientious regarding the installation and encryp-
tion:
With the exception of "Diablo," each authorized version of a Blizzard game comes
with a "CD Key." A CD Key is a unique sequence of alphanumeric characters
printed on a sticker attached to the case in which the CD-ROM was packaged. To
log on to Battle.net and access Battle.net mode, the game initiates an authentication
sequence or "secret handshake" between the game and the Battle.net server. In or-
der to play the Blizzard game contained on a CD-ROM, a user must first install the
game onto a computer and agree to the terms of the End User Licence [sic]
Agreement ("EULA") and Terms of Use ("TOU"). 14
4
Combining an effective control over access to the content with a well-
drafted agreement will create the type of consumer obligation sought by
software licensors. Blizzard followed these steps well and serves as an ef-
fective model for drafting and product distribution.
The facts in Davidson are not sympathetic to the defendants. The de-
fendants decrypted the software protecting the games at the Battle.net site,
reverse-engineered games and posted an open source version of the Bat-
tle.net site, created and distributed anticircumvention software, and created
a home for pirated Blizzard games because they had removed the need for
authentication.145 Under the Grokster standard, "one who distributes a de-
vice with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by
clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties."'46 Through the
many steps taken by the defendants in Davidson, they were secondarily
liable for inducement when they undertook to strip the protections from the
Blizzard games and create the online location for players to use their illegal
copies of the games.
143. Blizzard Entertainment is a subsidiary of Vivendi Universal Games, Inc.
144. Jung, 422 F.3d at 634 (footnotes omitted).
145. Id. at 636-37.
146. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37
(2005).
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This, however, was not the question before the Eighth Circuit in
Davidson because liability had already been established. The court quickly
found that the defendants had violated Section 1201. The legal question
remaining on appeal was the extent to which the DMCA provisions pro-
vided a safe harbor for the defendants.
Despite the earlier discussion of the EOLA and TOU, the Eighth Cir-
cuit did not directly answer the question regarding the reverse-engineering
limitation. It focused on the narrowness of the statutory exception in Sec-
tion 1201(f) that circumvention is allowed "'for the sole purpose' of trying
to achieve 'interoperability' of computer programs through reverse engi-
neering." '47 The court identified a four-prong test for when to use the ex-
ception:
To successfully prove the interoperability defense under § 1201 (f), Appellants must
show: (1) they lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program; (2)
the information gathered as a result of the reverse engineering was not previously
readily available to the person engaging in the circumvention; (3) the sole purpose
of the reverse engineering was to identify and analyze those elements of the pro-
gram that were necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently created
computer program with other programs; and (4) the alleged circumvention did not
constitute infringement.
1 48
Although the Eighth Circuit did not apply this test to the interoperabil-
ity discussion, earlier in the opinion it stated that
"[p]rivate parties are free to contractually forego the limited ability to reverse engi-
neer a software product under the exemptions of the Copyright Act[,]" and "a state
can permit parties to contract away a fair use defense or to agree not to engage in
uses of copyrighted material that are permitted by the copyright law if the contract
is freely negotiated."'
' 49
Had the court explained that the breach of the EULA or TOU rendered this
not a lawful use of the program, then it would be clear that reverse-
engineering for interoperability may be waived. Instead, the Eighth Circuit
focused on the "sole purpose" for reverse-engineering in the third prong of
the defense. The defendants failed to establish this prong and thus lost on
their Section 1201 (f) defense.'50
Unfortunately, there is a strong inference in Davidson that similar
EULA or TOU language can eliminate Section 1201(f) even if the four-
prong test is otherwise followed. Such an inference is misguided because
the approach will undermine the statutory balancing of public interests.
147. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 641 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting 17
U.S.C. § 1201(f)).
148. Id. at 641-42.
149. Id. at 639 (citation omitted) (quoting Bowers v. Baystate Techs, Inc., 320 F.3d
1317, 1325-26, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
150. Id.
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At worst, the violation of the EULA or TOU is a breach of contract. It
should not rise to the level of an illegal acquisition of the software. 5' If the
breach does not make the acquisition of the software illegal, then a legiti-
mate competitor can reverse-engineer solely for the purpose of interopera-
bility without infringing the other party's copyright.'52 Congress intended
the prior decisions, such as Sega v. Accolade, to continue to allow compa-
nies to reverse-engineer their rivals and to utilize fair use to allow sufficient
copying to achieve interoperability.'53
The tension within the marketplace is that media companies often find
themselves on both sides of interoperability. The dominant author of one
software platform or game may wish to discourage interoperability to main-
tain its monopoly. In another product, however, that same company may
need to create a software product or module that works with a competitor's
product to achieve interoperability with its software.
The hearings on the DMCA strongly support the continued viability of
Sega and reverse-engineering. The Senate Report stated, "The objective is
to ensure that the effect of current case law interpreting the Copyright Act is
not changed by enactment of this legislation for certain acts of identification
and analysis done in respect of computer programs."'' 4
Ultimately, the consumer is much better served with broad legal pro-
tection for interoperability, which enhances ease of use and compatibility
for the end user. The congressional intent of Section 1201(f) reflects this
positive view of interoperability.
The entertainment and software industries are internally divided on the
policy, however. Well-established companies generally benefit from the
status quo, so they are more likely to seek bars to interoperability while
smaller or independent companies stand in much greater need of protection
through interoperability. The policy pits software and media companies
against one another. Because of the entwined ownership of software and
media companies, these policies may even pit divisions of the same con-
glomerate against each other.
To achieve the goals of Section 1201(f), Congress may need to spe-
cifically void any private agreements that bar reverse-engineering for the
purposes of interoperability. Such a proposal would inevitably invite re-
151. Careful drafting can make this distinction less clear. For example, an EULA
provision states that "Licensee's failure to comply with this Agreement results in the imme-
diate termination of this license to use the [Software]. Any use of the Software following
such termination is a violation of Licensor's copyright in the Software." While it may not be
good public policy to allow licensors to criminalize contract breaches with clever drafting,
the difficulty remains.
152. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992);
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
153. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 32 (1998). See Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d at 1527-28.
154. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 32 (1998).
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quests for similar protection for fair use, other non-infringing reverse-
engineering purposes, and other aspects of the EULA and TOU agreements.
Since many of these would be considered controversial by the industry rep-
resentatives, such a proposal will be difficult to enact. A simpler approach
would be for courts to recognize that breaches of an EULA and TOU are
not crimes or torts. They are merely breaches of contract. As such, courts
should not bar parties from continuing to seek interoperability of software, a
goal consistent with the congressional intent of current copyright policy.155
This would not provide protection to the defendants in Davidson, since their
piracy went well beyond interoperability to copy protected works and inter-
fere with the protected rights of the copyright holder.
IV. THE VIRTUAL 0
Bryce once had high hopes for the benefits of DRM and the opportuni-
ties for a micro-economy that could create an economic windfall for the
virtual buskers who earned a nickel per play from the celestial jukebox.
Pay-per-use systems were heavily discussed at the start of the Internet
age.'56 Judge Easterbrook had a vision of the future:
The concern about high transactions costs is a substantial one, though it diminishes
as time passes. Today your computer can negotiate many of these transactions (as
it does with DRM software) without your knowing, and micro-payment systems
may debit and credit accounts automatically. Technology is moving us toward the
world where transactions costs are close to zero, and the Coase Theorem can be a
reality rather than a thought experiment.
15 7
Even today, there remains some hope for the future of entertainment
and literary works. "[O]flen overlooked but at least of equal importance,
DRM is intended to lower costs for obtaining content legally. The goal of
DRM is to enable and facilitate legal licensing of digital information by
155. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). In Salin-
ger, the defendant violated the user agreements of the libraries of Harvard and Princeton. Id.
at 93. The breach of contract resulting in unauthorized access to the copyrighted works did
not play any role in the analysis except to assure that the unpublished works had not lost their
copyright protection. Id. at 96.
156. See Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Con-
sent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 281, 295 (2003)
("Microconsent, as it were, would make it possible to charge users small amounts for small
uses, and we could march down the demand curve for a particular work."); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership: Reconsidering Incentives in a Digital Age, 52
DEPAuL L. REv. 1121, 1126-27 (2003); Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards
a Political Economy of Information, 52 DuKE L.J. 1245, 1254 (2003).
157. Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 Hous. L. REv. 953, 966-67
(2005).
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reducing the transactional costs for consumers to find, access, and use the
digital information they demand."'58
A. Reinvigorating the Public Domain
Ironically, the final concern regarding DRM and the attendant loss of
consumer respect for copyright may be the potential for the "virtual 0," the
intersection of the public domain, open source entertainment, the creative
commons, and the various attempts by authors and artists to exploit the so-
cial network capabilities of the new media.
There is no inherent conflict between a robust DRM regime and a ro-
bust public domain or shared domain environment. Just as copyright does
not eliminate the public domain nor eradicate the First Amendment, the
technological measures available to content providers need not further erode
these economic and practical necessities. The point is not new.
As more and more copyrighted content is released in digital form, the risk of a
shrinking domain for fair use has inspired some observers to ask whether DRM
technology may evolve to preserve end user freedoms. Under this view, DRM
technology need not be inherently restrictive of fair use rights. Rather, limiting fair
use via DRM is simply one choice among many alternative design decisions that
DRM architects might adopt.
5 9
The statute itself takes a small step in this direction. By its terms it
does not reach any works in the public domain. "No person shall circum-
vent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work pro-
tected under this title."'" Theoretically, works in the public domain such as
the Sony Reader classics library have no protection under the DMCA. Of
course, aggressive distributors can readily add a bit of copyrighted material
to the public domain content and then invoke the DMCA.
The concern has been expressed quite effectively:
As the content marketplace continues to become more digitized, [interest] groups
have argued DRM access controls will "creep" into collections of works that not
only contain limited portions of copyrighted material, but also contain substantial
portions from the public domain as well, in the form of "thin copyrights." Thus,
protecting these works with access control mechanisms bolstered by the DMCA
could give copyright owners significant control over works that may not be copy-
rightable.161
The fear that nominal works will be used to bootstrap DRM onto pub-
lic domain works is the somewhat inaccurate aphorism that "you cannot
158. Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger, Beyond Copyright: Managing Information Rights
with DRM, 84 DENV. U. L. REv. 181, 181-82 (2006).
159. Armstrong, supra note 54, at 51.
160. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
161. Eric Matthew Hinkes, Access Controls in the Digital Era and the Fair Use/First
Sale Doctrines, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 685, 711 (2007).
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copy the copy, you can only copy the original.' 62 The source of this apho-
rism proves that the rule is more limited. Judge Learned Hand explained
that a second author should not "be free to use the composition of another,
who himself has not borrowed."'63 When a work is original to an author, it
may be protected by copyright even if an identical work is in the public
domain. But if an author incorporates elements from the public domain into
a protected work, the materials borrowed from the public domain should
never stop being available to all users of that work.
The statute makes clear that DRM does not reach public domain mate-
rials, but if DRM is applied to both public domain and protected works, the
management system can be enforced. Even though the public domain as-
pects of a work are free for the taking by subsequent authors, the DRM and
the ambiguity regarding the extent of the work's copyright scope may cause
a chilling effect. So while some legal solutions to this problem are avail-
able, the immediate solution may be a market one.
One response to aggressive digital rights management is an equally
aggressive encouragement of the public domain. In this regard, efforts such
as the Google book project provide a tremendous social value. All public
domain works available to Google are being made available in PDF for-
mat."6 Project Bartleby 65 provides a library of free online resources that are
selected for their historical and literary importance. Through these and
162. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903) ("Others
are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy."). Judge Learned Hand
explained the role of copying the second work as follows:
Any subsequent person is, of course, free to use all works in the public domain as
sources for his compositions. No later work, though original, can take that from
him. But there is no reason in justice or law why he should not be compelled to re-
sort to the earlier works themselves, or why he should be free to use the composi-
tion of another, who himself has not borrowed. If he claims the rights of the pub-
lic, let him use them; he picks the brains of the copyright owner as much, whether
his original composition be old or new. The defendant's concern lest the public
should be shut off from the use of works in the public domain is therefore illusory;
no one suggests it. That domain is open to all who tread it; not to those who in-
vade the closes of others, however similar.
Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
163. Dillingham, 298 F. at 150 (emphasis added).
164. See Google Book Search, What You'll See When You Search on Google Books
Search, http://books.google.com/intl/en/googlebooks/screenshots.html (last visited May 4,
2008) ("Each book includes an 'About this book' page with basic bibliographic data like
title, author, publication date, length and subject. For some books you may also see addi-
tional information like key terms and phrases, references to the book from scholarly publica-
tions or other books, chapter titles and a list of related books.... You can see books in Full
View if the book is out of copyright, or if the publisher or author has asked to make the book
fully viewable. The Full View allows you to view any page from the book, and if the book is
in the public domain, you can download, save and print a PDF version to read at your own
pace.").
165. See Bartleby.com, http://www.bartleby.com (last visited May 4, 2008).
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similar projects, DRM will become irrelevant for published works.
Whether there is corporate or charitable support for the same activities in
music, television, art, and film remains to be seen. 166
B. Embracing Open Source Art
A second response has been the vigorous open source community. In
software, open source has proven itself very successful. The web browser
Firefox, e-mail client Thunderbird, and teaching platform Moodle are just a
few of the highly competitive software programs that claim meaningful
market share and provide strong creative leadership in their fields.
In music, experiments in open source musical creation are few and
rather trivial. Instead, the music industry has used the technology to em-
power musicians to self-publish or self-promote their music. While this
may have little or no direct financial compensation, it allows musicians and
bands to grow their fan base. The bands earn their compensation in live
performances. The free music made available to the public is a small loss
when compared to the earnings at the bars, clubs, and concert halls.
Although the model of free music distribution has not supplanted the
traditional record company recording contract, it is a legitimate alternative
for these artists and may reflect the most successful shift in entertainment
business models. Fortunately for this model, access to commercial quality
sound recording and editing equipment has made the move towards self-
publishing practical. While there may be some difference in production
quality, high quality albums can be made without the expenses traditionally
associated with the studio recording system. Moreover, since standard re-
cord contracts require that the recording artists pay the cost of recording (in
the form of recoupable advances), the choice to reduce these expenses also
helps protect the musicians from potentially devastating debt owed to re-
cording companies. There are other business implications to this model,
such as the lack of promotional funding and radio station air-play support
for the album. Nonetheless, for many recording artists, the ability to control
their own content and build their own fan base is a desirable and sustainable
business model.
Bryce discovered the benefits of a web-based promotional strategy af-
ter the first recording contract signed by Bryce resulted in a $25,000 liabil-
ity to a record company that refused to exercise the option on the band's
second album. After obtaining a release from the record label, Bryce re-
166. See, e.g., Springfield Township High School Virtual Library,
http://www.sdst.org/shs/library/cfimages.html (last visited May 4, 2008) (listing of such
resources); Wikimedia Meta-Wiki, Help: Public Domain Image Resources,
http://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Help:Public-domain-image-resources&oldid=
647452 (last visited May 4, 2008) (listing of sources).
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fused to sign with another label, instead writing songs and touring with an
unsigned band. Bryce received little radio play but did manage to land one
summer tour.
Bryce's band also learned the lesson of the jam band. The band en-
courages audience members to record the live concerts and trade them
online. 67 The band has a slow but growing following. Bryce often uses the
songs of the band to supplement the YouTube clips. Through Facebook,
MySpace, and other social networking sites, the band actively promotes its
upcoming concerts, posts jam sessions, and even auditioned for a new bass
player.
But Bryce wants more. Bryce wants to be a professional author and
artist, not a waiter or copywriter.
Bryce has not yet found the vehicle for using Second Life and the
online social networks to create a feature-length film. Bryce's documentary
experiment, however, was something of a success. Bryce had observed a
young audience member being punished by her father. Bryce put out a call
on the band's website and on the social networks for kids who felt they
were the victims of excessive corporal punishment to answer a short series
of questions-on camera. Bryce asked them to film the paddles, belts, or
other "tools" used. And of course, Bryce had each person expressly give
permission for their personal video logs to be used in the making of Bryce's
documentary.
Bryce received forty-seven clips, of which six seemed like hoaxes.
After making a rough cut of the documentary, Bryce was told that every-
thing in the documentary should be carefully verified before broadcasting
any of it to avoid defamation charges. To Bryce's dismay, after some due
diligence, one of the more dramatic clips seemed increasingly unlikely, so
Bryce removed it from the documentary. On the other hand, one of the par-
ents interviewed-on camera-was even more forthcoming and compelling
than her son, so the due diligence ultimately added content to the finished
product.
The use of social networks to help create the documentary footage and
highlight this social issue worked quite well for Bryce. A few of the short
clips were posted to YouTube with links to the full-length documentary.
Bryce returned to the methodology for a documentary on pollution and
the environment, asking the public to videotape examples of waste, garbage
dumping, environmental damage, local clean-up efforts, and other related
167. See, e.g., Live Music Archive, http://www.archive.org/details/etree (last visited
May 4, 2008) ("etree.org is a community committed to providing the highest quality live
concerts in a lossless, downloadable format.... All music in this Collection is from trade-
friendly artists and is strictly noncommercial, both for access here and for any further distri-
bution. Artists' commercial releases are off-limits." (emphasis omitted)).
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stories. Again, Bryce was able to weave the material into a compelling
documentary.
Buoyed by the success of the two documentaries, Bryce created "So-
cialdocs.org."'6 8 Bryce not only posted an edited version of the documen-
tary but posted all the original footage. On the site, Bryce explained how to
create a compelling and journalistically sound documentary, including the
need for verifying all the content before finishing the documentary, and the
process (as well as the costs) for adding music. Participants on the website
were encouraged to join in on documentaries under development, to suggest
new documentary topics, and to edit the submitted footage into finished
documentaries. The website participants then voted for the best documenta-
ries on each topic, and those "winners" were offered for commercial distri-
bution in theatres and on television. Through the process, Bryce has be-
come a more thoughtful filmmaker and storyteller.
Bryce still wanted to make feature films. To help get films financed
and distributors interested, Bryce actually staged a reading in Second Life.
Using the virtual world, actors performed the parts using the animated sets
available in the virtual life backdrop to help bring the script to life. It
served as a virtual story-board for the film. A few investors were interested,
but most were confused by the "animated" nature of the staged reading.
Second Life proved far too cumbersome as a platform for script develop-
ment, but one of the motion picture studios became interested in adapting
the approach for internal purposes.
Again, Bryce experimented with additional art forms. Bryce gave up
the minstrel character in World of Warcraft for a troubadour Orc, known
for heavy metal in both song and blade. The Tales of the Troubadour be-
came something of a cult hit, earning Bryce a great deal of attention online
in the role-playing game, a featured appearance at Comic-Con, 69 and a
guest role in a comic book (for the character). As the online role playing
and virtual social networks continue to grow and mature into new media,
the role of feature films and television may diminish. Feature films will
become the opera of the twenty-first century, funded by charitable donors
who remember the relevance to their childhood, even though such films are
no longer in step with the future. Certainly there are some who still pro-
mote silent movies and others who spend their time and effort on black-and-
white films.
168. http://www.socialdocs.org (as of the publication of this Article, the website is
not yet active).
169. See Comic-Con Int'l, http://www.comic-con.org/ (last visited May 4, 2008) (the
world's largest comic book and science fiction annual convention).
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C. The Brave New World of the Virtual 0
It may be that Bryce has stepped onto the Virtual 0, where the
wooden stage has given way to a limitless arena, bounded only by the
flights of fancy imagined by the programmers, illustrators, and participants
in the online world. Can these worlds also sustain a professional class of
participants who earn a living at their craft, or will these online environ-
ments rely on the volunteer efforts of community theatre players? The me-
dium is far too new to answer that question.
Bryce remains very talented and perpetually relentless. Every age has
had its star musicians, writers, artists, and personalities, and every age will
have its Euripides, Shakespeare, Bob Dylan, or Steven Spielberg. Bryce
hopes to achieve success and join the pantheon. If DRM fails, however, and
legitimate protection for copyright wanes, the size of the modem pantheon
will shrink, and fewer artists will earn enough to avoid needing a day job.
Without any reward for writing short stories, fewer writers will learn their
craft to write great novels. Without any professional promotion by record
companies, some of the best new music will never be made, encouraged, or
heard.
Television and feature films will suffer the most, because they are the
media in which it is hardest to do well when one works home alone-even
if home alone actually includes a social network of thousands. On the other
hand, perhaps the need for DRM is less relevant for television and motion
pictures. Members of the public recognize the economic value and conse-
quences of pirating television and feature films in a way that may dissuade
them from copying those works, even though the same person would not
hesitate to copy songs from a friend.170 If so, then perhaps there is hope for
the motion picture industry despite fears of download efficiency.
Apple CEO Steve Jobs's suggestion that DRM has already failed may
be too precipitous as well as too self-serving. If the public perceives a dif-
ferent obligation to respect the content of film and television, then the solu-
tion is to follow Jobs's recommendation that DRM be eliminated from mu-
sic, specifically to further distinguish songs from movies, television, and
software where DRM has a more significant role.
The Copyright Act itself is based on fundamentally different treatment
of music than other media. Sections 114 and 115 treat music and sound
recordings as sui generis.'71 The old jukebox license, copyright royalty tri-
bunals, and other aspects of the statute reflect the vastly different social
expectations placed on music. No painter would allow "covers" where
170. It is entirely plausible that the copying of a $1.00 song is considered socially de
minimis.
171. 17 U.S.C. §§ 114-15 (2000).
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other artists were able to reprint the work by paying a statutory rate, nor
would any novelist or sculptor. Music, therefore, is different.
Judge Easterbrook would argue that the market transactions should be
the source of variation rather than the statute:"2
A standards-setting organization could prescribe, say, 20 different copying rules-
sets of permission and payment terms. There may be competing organizations,
with their own standards. Each Internet server and client would understand these
terms and carry out the negotiation automatically, remitting any payment to an
agreed depository by secure methods.
173
Whether the default rules should come exclusively from contracts or
whether the Copyright Act has a significant default rule-setting function
remains open for debate. Whichever the source, the ability for the public to
pay for a menu of rights associated with a particular work is no longer
merely a theoretical suggestion.
Apple has already introduced such a model by selling DRM-free ver-
sions of songs on iTunes for $1.29, a thirty percent premium over Apple's
proprietary DRM protocol. 174 Moreover, Steve Jobs was correct in his letter
about DRM for his iPods. He has built a business model designed to exploit
the failures in the music industry and has done so brilliantly. iPods and
iPhones take advantage of the content from ripped CDs and from illegally
shared downloads even as Jobs negotiated a license for lawful music that
goes much closer to the expectations of the consumer in the appropriate
number of copies and devices. 7 ' In this way, the license co-opts the con-
172. Easterbrook, supra note 157, at 972.
173. Id.
174. iTunes Plus, http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/sales.html (last visited May
4, 2008). See also http://phobos.apple.com/WebObjects/MZStore.woa/wa/iTunesPlus-
FAQPage.
175. See, e.g., iTunes Store Terms of Service, 9.b, http://www.apple.com/legal/-
itunes/us/service.html (last visited May 4, 2008):
b. Use of Products. You acknowledge that Products... contain security technology
that limits your usage of Products to the following applicable Usage Rules, and,
you agree to use Products in compliance with the applicable Usage Rules.
Usage Rules
(i) Your use of the Products is conditioned upon your prior acceptance of the terms
of this Agreement.
(ii) You shall be authorized to use the Products only for personal, noncommercial
use.
(iii) You shall be authorized to use the Products on five Apple-authorized devices
at any time,....
(iv) You shall be able to store Products from up to five different Accounts on cer-
tain devices, such as an iPod,... at a time; ....
(v) You shall be authorized to burn an audio play list up to seven times.
(vi) You shall not be entitled to burn Video Products ....
(vii) You shall be entitled to export, bum (if applicable) or copy (if applicable)
Products solely for personal, noncommercial use.
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sumer. By drafting the license to reflect behavior, we can more easily flag
the egregious offenses rather than shout blindly as a thronging mob breaks
our rules. Jobs has understood consumer behavior far better than the record
companies, in part because Apple can benefit from these behaviors while
the record companies can only fashion policies to limit the damage.
CONCLUSION
The DMCA remains a modestly effective weapon for disarming the
most egregious circumvention products and stabbing the most aggressive
pirates. Courts yield the statute like a dull blade, effective only at close
range. The tip can only prick a tiny fraction of the infringers, and few are
intimidated.
Despite the limited practical effect on access to circumvention tech-
nology, the cases help clarify the law and the illegal nature of DeCSS, soft-
ware designed to thwart Macrovision, and similar black box technologies.
Such cases help the MPAA police the marketplace. To the extent that Wal-
Mart, Target, and Best Buy continue to dominate retail sales, the litigation
and the statute keep the store shelves clear of circumvention technology.
Unfortunately, the hijacking of the DMCA by consumer goods manu-
facturers such as Lexmark and Chamberlain has further eroded the credibil-
ity of the law. Using the statute as a shield against legitimate market com-
petition is so obviously beyond the intent of Congress that it should not
have required the finely-crafted court decisions presently addressing the
issue. Unless courts begin to broadly reject these claims because the goods
being sold are not works under the Copyright Act, manufacturers will inevi-
tably mirror their software to match the court's opinions. Courts need not
allow the manufacturers to free-ride on the software protection. Neither
Congress nor WIPO were ambiguous regarding the scope of these protec-
tions. If the courts err by denying too many claims for protection, Congress
can weigh in to adjust the balance, but the starting point should be the scope
of the statute as contemplated when it was adopted internationally through
WIPO and implemented by Congress. Nowhere were garage doors or com-
puter toner cartridges discussed as needing anti-piracy legislation.
Beyond the problem caused by the manufacturers remains the problem
caused by the software companies' clickwrap and shrinkwrap agreements.
Again, the congressional compromises identified in the statute are more
(ix) Any burning (if applicable) or exporting capabilities are solely an accommoda-
tion to you and shall not constitute a grant or waiver (or other limitation or implica-
tion) of any rights of the copyright owners in any audio or video content, sound re-
cording, underlying musical composition, or artwork embodied in any Product.
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reasonable than the court opinions regarding those provisions. Since Sec-
tion 1201(f) provides for reverse-engineering for purposes of interoperabil-
ity, the copyright owner should not be able to impose contract terms that
strip the public of this opportunity. It is precisely because the technology
exists to completely control the distribution of the copyrighted work that
digital rights management is regulated by the DMCA, and when that regula-
tion includes exceptions, those exceptions should be given due weight.
But we must learn from the shrewd lessons of Mr. Jobs. If DRM is
worth saving-and I believe it is artistically and socially imperative to do so
if we hope to stop the wasteland from spreading to the Internet, the movie
house, and the bookstore-then we must reform its use.
The purveyors of media protected by DRM must stop railing at the
public and begin to conform their expectations to the expectations of the
public as part of the effort to find an enforceable and defensible line in the
sand. For example, the RIAA should always have had a system that in-
cluded pre-litigation fact finding to assure that hard core pirates were the
target, not casual users or the wrong parties. For software, interoperability
should be a fair use, and fair use must be explicitly made an affirmative
defense to Section 1201. Similarly, the work protected by DRM must sub-
stantially be protected under copyright and provide no DMCA protection to
collections of public domain works, consumer electronics, or other products
outside the original intent of the statute. The DVR (i.e., TIVO) must always
allow fast forwarding and rewinding through any content, whether it be
commercials, programming, or even the FBI warning. Finally, to find a
compromise with the public, best practices in licensing should mirror that of
Apple, so that consumer usability, interoperability, and convenience are not
done away with.
A decade after WIPO mandated anticircumvention and digital rights
management, there has been some modest success with the statute, but
much work remains to be done. Once again, I must ask whether the fight
against piracy would be significantly different had Chapter 12 not been
adopted. The answer is not a resounding yes.
Ten years later, the DMCA has offered only a modest start on the road
to addressing piracy. When I see a landscape without the ability to enforce
copyright, I fear the spread of the wasteland. If the DMCA can help us to
craft the argument for copyright protection, it needs to be used in modera-
tion and enforced without overreaching. If not, the cacophony of voices
calling for its demise will drown out the music and artistry of those Con-
gress sought to protect.
The stage is set, but the final act is not yet written.
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